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I. INTRODUCTION
Development is a function of good government.1 For this reason, or
in spite of it, since the rise of new states in Africa (un-snugly
superimposed on the numerous old societies in the region)2 nearly sixty
years ago,3 there has been a recurring debate regarding the appropriate

1. See Kemal Daviş, Good Governance and Economic Performance, Op-Ed,
BROOKINGS (Mar. 13, 2014), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/good-governanceand-economic-performance/ (“It is the nature of governance that determines whether
people deploy their talents and energy in pursuit of innovation, production, and job
creation, or in rent seeking and lobbying for political protection.”); Barack Obama,
Remarks by the President to the Ghanaian Parliament, WHITE HOUSE (July 11, 2009),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-ghanaianparliament (stating that “[d]evelopment depends on good governance.”). For
definition of development, see infra notes 92-99 and accompanying text.
2. See generally OLD SOCIETIES AND NEW STATES: THE QUEST FOR MODERNITY
IN ASIA AND AFRICA (Clifford Geertz, ed., 1963).
3. This is counting from the Gold Coast’s independence as Ghana on March 6,
1957. Ghana was the first country in Sub-Saharan Africa to become independent.
Idara Sunday Ikoh, Ghana Independence 1957, WEB CHRONOLOGY PROJECT (2016),
http://www.thenagain.info/WebChron/Africa/Ghana.html. For more extended
analysis, see F.M. BOURRET, GHANA: THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE, 1919-57 (1960).
Other countries soon followed. In 1960, famously called the year of Africa’s
independence, 17 countries achieved independence. 1960: The Year of Independence,
FRANCE24 (Feb. 16, 2010), http://www.france24.com/en/20100214-1960-yearindependence. These countries included Senegal, one of the two countries here under
examination. These countries, in the order of their independence, were: Cameroon
(Jan. 1); Togo (Apr. 27); Madagascar (June 26); Democratic Republic of the Congo,
later Zaïre (June 30); Somalia (July 1); Benin (Aug. 1); Niger (Aug. 3); Upper Volta,
later Burkina Faso (Aug. 5); Ivory Coast, later Côte d’Ivoire (Aug. 7); Chad (Aug.
11); Central African Republic (Aug. 13); Republic of the Congo (Aug. 15); Gabon
(Aug. 17); Senegal (Aug. 20); Mali (Sept. 22); Nigeria (Oct. 1); and Mauritania (Nov.
28). Id. Senegal and Mali (then French Soudan) were previously granted
independence on Jan. 17, 1959, as Federation of Mali, but the union was short-lived.
Id. It was not until 1965 that The Gambia, the other of the two countries here under
examination, won its own independence. And not until 1994 before black majority
rule took place in South Africa, the last bastion of colonialism in the continent. More
discussion on Senegal and The Gambia is included in Part II, the historical
background of this paper. For brevity, this Article dispenses with formal practice by
henceforth referring to The Gambia as simply “Gambia,” except when quoting other
writers, whether in the text or footnotes.
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political system4 for the pursuit of African development.5 Because of
the artificial boundaries European colonizers bequeathed to Africa,6 the
continent has more landlocked countries—fifteen of them to be exact—
than any other region in the world.7 Related to this impediment, several
4. A political system is the set of legal institutions that constitute a government
or a state. D. Alan Heslop, Political System, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Mar. 17,
2017), https://www.britannica.com/topic/political-system. It is part of the broader
social system. Id. The term is used interchangeably in this Article with government or
the state.
5. There is no suggestion that African leaders have always used the state to
legitimately pursue development, for they do not always do so. Instead, as Professor
Claude Ake most presciently pointed out many years ago, time and again, these
leaders have (ab)used the state for purposes that have little to do with development.
See CLAUDE AKE, DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA (1996). According to
Ake, the trouble with economic development in Africa “is not so much that
development has failed as that it was never really on the agenda in the first place.” Id.
at 1. To be sure, African leaders were not the only rulers who used the state
illegitimately for purposes other than development. Instead, the colonial authorities
before them did the same. See, e.g., Matthew Craven, Between Law and History: The
Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 and the Logic of Free Trade, 3 LONDON REV. INT’L
L. 31-59 (Mar. 10, 2015), http://lril.oxfordjournals.org/content/3/1/31.full. One
infamous moment was the Berlin Conference of 1885 designed for factors other than
to benefit Africans (except arguably for the abolition of the slave trade). Id. The main
purpose was to consolidate pacification to minimize friction among European
authorities in their scramble for colonies in the continent. See, e.g., id; MURIEL E.
CHAMBERLAIN, THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA (Pearson Education Ltd., 3d ed. 2010);
STIG FÖRSTER ET AL., BISMARK, EUROPE, AND AFRICA: THE BERLIN AFRICA
CONFERENCE 1884-1885 AND THE ONSET OF PARTITION (1989).
6. Artificial boundaries refers to borders determined arbitrarily on maps by
European capitals with no regard for geography (factors such as rivers, mountains,
and related natural landmarks) and ethnic composition of the areas whose borders
were designed. See Stelios Michalopoulos & Elias Papaioannou, The Long-Run
Effects of the Scramble for Africa (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 17620-11, 2011), http://www.nber.org/papers/w17620.
7. Landlocked states are countries which lack direct coastal access to the sea.
These are: Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad,
Ethiopia, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe. Matt Rosenberg, How Many African Countries Are Landlocked? And Why
Does
It
Matter,
ABOUT
EDUCATION
(Apr.
09,
2017),
http://geography.about.com/od/economic-geography/fl/How-Many-AfricanCountries-Are-Landlocked.htm. See also PAUL COLLIER, THE BOTTOM BILLION:
WHY THE POOREST COUNTRIES ARE FAILING AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 51–
63 (2007). A country’s level of access to water can have an enormous impact on its
economy in many ways, three of which are most notable. These three negative impacts
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economies in the continent are too small and fragmented to achieve
economies of scale independently.8 Accordingly, in the years
immediately following independence, there was much debate regarding
appropriate political structures in the context of the capacity of these
marginal states to economically develop.9 Regional economic
integration schemes evolved in various parts of the continent in
response to this concern.10 The proliferation coincided with the birth of
are less access to trade (it is cheaper to transport goods over water than over land),
high transit costs, and increased dependence on “transit” neighbors (i.e. states with
access to the sea or coast). Rosenberg, supra. The fifteen landlocked states do not
include partially-landlocked states like Gambia, under scrutiny in this paper.
8. See Paul Collier & Tony Venables, Trade and Economic Performance: Does
Africa’s Fragmentation Matter? Paper Presented at the Annual Bank Conference on
Development Economics, Cape Town, S. Afr. (June 9-11, 2008),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTABCDESOUAFR2008/Resources/TonyVena
bles.pdf.
9. See BASIL DAVIDSON, MODERN AFRICA: A SOCIAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY
218–45 (3d ed. 1994) (portraying “questions about development” among various
“progress and failure” emanating from new governments). In retrospect, given the
urgent need for development, it was a debate tinged with much irony. For example,
Tanzanian leader, Julius Nyerere, advised that Africans “must run” while the rest of
the world walks if the region stood any chance of bridging the gap in development
between it and the rest of the world. See generally WILLIAM EDGETT SMITH, WE MUST
RUN WHILE THEY WALK: A PORTRAIT OF AFRICA’S JULIUS NYERERE (1971).
10. See Trudi Hartzenberg, Regional Integration in Africa (World Trade
Organization, Staff Working Paper ERSD-2011-14, 2011) (stating, inter alia, that
“African governments have concluded a very large number of regional integration
arrangements, several of which have significant membership overlap”); Tesfaye
Dinka & Walter Kennes, Africa’s Regional Integration Arrangements: History and
Challenges, Discussion Paper No. 74, EUROPEAN CENTER FOR DEV. POLICY
MANAGEMENT (Sept. 2007), http://ecdpm.org/publications/africas-regionalintegration-arrangements-history-challenges/; Olufemi A. Babarinde, Regionalism
and African Foreign Policies, AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICIES 215–48 (Stephen Wright,
ed., 1999) (surveying the impacts of regional integration on African foreign policies).
See also Caroline Ko, Regional Integration is a Must for Africa, WORLD ECON.
FORUM (May 10, 2013), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2013/05/regionalintegration-is-a-must-for-africa/. These economic communities include: East African
Community (EAC), originally formed in 1967, collapsed in 1977, and revived in 2000
(in fact the history of the organization dates back to 1917, as indicated in infra note
25); the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), formed in 1975;
the Southern African Development Community (SADC), formed in 1980 originally
as South African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC); the Economic
Community of Central African States (ECCAS), founded in 1983; the
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), founded in 1986; the Arab
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the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) in 1958, soon after
Ghana’s independence in 1957.11 The ECA is charged with the mission
of promoting economic and social development in Africa, fostering
intra-regional economic integration, and galvanizing cooperation for
Africa’s development.12
Then came the “lost decade of the 1980s” when Africa fell behind
the rest of the world in many areas of general living standards, including
access to education and healthcare.13 In actuality, this period spanned
close to one generation from 1970 to 1995. During that lost decade,
Maghreb Union (UMA), founded in 1989; the Community of Sahel-Saharan States
(CEN-SAD), founded in 1993; and, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern
Africa (COMESA), formed in 1994. For detailed information on these communities,
see PHILIP C. AKA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN NIGERIA’S EXTERNAL RELATIONS: BUILDING
THE RECORD OF A MORAL SUPERPOWER 227–43 (2017). Gambia and Senegal, the two
countries here under examination, are founding members of ECOWAS, the key
economic community in West Africa. Id. at 229 (Table 10.1); see also Economic
Community of West African States, INT’L DEMOCRACY WATCH,
http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/ index.php/economic-community-ofwest-african-states-.
11. See KWAME AKONOR, AFRICAN ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS 11 (2009).
12. Overview, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa,
http://www.uneca.org/pages/overview (last visited Apr. 12, 2017). To realize these
goals, the ECA conducts various activities, including collecting data on African
development and providing advisory services in key thematic fields, among them
macro-economic policy, regional integration and trade, and governance. Id.
13. See John Darnton, “Lost Decade” Drains Africa’s Vitality, NY TIMES (June
19, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/06/19/world/lost-decade-drains-africa-svitality.html?pagewanted=all. It was an era marked by structural adjustment programs
(and resultant belt-tightening programs with negative consequences for healthcare,
education and other social programs) on many African economies, imposed in return
for loans by international monetary institutions, specifically the International
Monetary Fund, and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
more famously known as the World Bank. See, e.g., Fraser Logan, Did Structural
Adjustment Programs Assist African Development?, E-INT’L RELATIONS STUDENTS
(Jan.
13,
2015),
http://www.e-ir.info/2015/01/13/did-structural-adjustmentprogrammes-assist-african-development/; Franz Heidhues & Gideon Obare, Lessons
from Structural Adjustment Programs and Their Effects in Africa, in 1 Q. J. INT’L
AGRIC.
55–64
(2011),
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/155490/2/4
Heidhues.pdf. See also H. W. Singer, The 1980s: A Lost Decade—Development in
Reverse?, in GROWTH AND EXTERNAL DEBT MANAGEMENT 46–56 (H. W. Singer &
Soumitra Sharma, eds., 1989); A THOUSAND FLOWERS: SOCIAL STRUGGLES AGAINST
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT IN AFRICAN UNIVERSITIES (Silvia Federici et al., eds.,
2000).
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alternately referred to in this Article as “locust years,” real per capita
income nearly doubled in all world regions, except for Black Africa,
which instead declined.14 In the period since the lost decade, the
political-structure debate turned into a debate regarding whether there
was any chance left in the capacity of African states to engender
development.15
The discourse chimed with the important works of Professors
Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg on the non-institutionalized
nature of leadership in Africa as well as the lack of legitimacy of
African states. Regarding the first, Jackson and Rosberg argued that
rather than institutions, such as political parties, government in Africa
is often governed by personal rule.16 For Professors Jackson and

14. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEVELOPMENT,
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: PERFORMANCE, PROSPECTS AND POLICY
ISSUES, passim (2001), http://unctad.org/en/Docs/pogdsafricad1.en.pdf. “Locust
years” or “years of locust” is a Biblical expression that denotes period of economic
hardship.
RANDOM
HOUSE
UNABRIDGED
DICT.
(1997),
https://www.infoplease.com/dictionary/locust-years. Two germane sections in the
Bible are: Joel 2:25 which reads, “I will restore to you the years the swarming locust
has eaten”; and Genesis 41: 1–37 where Joseph interpreted for the Pharaoh of Egypt
two interlinked dreams, one involving seven years of bountiful harvests followed by
seven years of severe famine, which he wisely solved with advice for the Pharaoh to
store grain during the bountiful years in preparation for the lean years. Unlike ancient
Egypt, Africa endured economic famine unpreceded by any bountiful harvests, and
there was no perceivable restoration of any years that the proverbial swarming locust
devoured. Part III.B, infra, lays out the context for this famine within the meaning of
this Article.
15. See AKE, supra note 5, passim.
16. See generally ROBERT H. JACKSON & CARL G. ROSBERG, PERSONAL RULE
IN BLACK AFRICA: PRINCE, AUTOCRAT, PROPHET, TYRANT (1982). The categories of
autocrat and tyrants should be obvious, leaving princes and prophets as the only two
categories needing elaboration. Prince is a nomenclature Professors Jackson and
Rosberg set aside for nondemocratic leaders, such as Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya; Haile
Selassie of Ethiopia; two rulers of Liberia, William Tubman and William Tolbert;
and, for our purpose here, Leopold Senghor of Senegal. While there are important
variations among them, what these leaders had in common was their ability to amass
state power during their period in office to the diminishment of the constitutional order
that they inherited when they came into office. Prophet whose list is thin in Africa
included, most notably, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania.
While again, there are variations among them, political prophets are visionaries who
worked to reshape their societies. One of the weaknesses of the Jackson-Rosberg
theory is that none of the categories fits an African leader like Dawda Jawara who,
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Rosberg, lack of domestic legitimacy refers to the reality that many
weak states in Africa persist out of juridical factors embedded in
international law rather than out of a capacity to perform the domestic
empirical functions of a state, met when a national government (the
entity in international law which represents the state) exercises effective
“control over the people, organizations, and activities within [its]
territorial jurisdiction . . . .”17
Notable improvements came after the lost decade of the 1980s. For
example, in 2011, the Economist branded Africa a “hopeful
continent,”18 after declaring the region “hopeless” little over one decade
before.19 However, progress remains uneven and non-robust.20 Several
narratives reflect this assessment. Some analysts advocate “grassroots
development efforts that build on domestic cultural institutions” as the

although he remained in office for nearly three decades, did not wield power as a “big
man” to the detriment of the evolution of institutions and the rule of law.
17. Robert H. Jackson & Carl G. Rosberg, Why Africa’s Weak States Persist:
The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood, 35 WORLD POLITICS 1 (1982). Jackson
and Rosberg observed that “[i]f the persistence of a state were primarily the result of
empirical statehood,” several “African countries would clearly not qualify as states
some of the time.” Id. at 3. For them the independence of these states “reveals the
assumption of the contemporary international community that even countries of very
questionable viability and capacities can be preserved by a benevolent international
society.” Id. at 16.
18. The Hopeful Continent: Africa Rising, ECONOMIST (Dec. 3, 2011),
http://www.economist.com/node/21541015 (stating that after “decades of slow
growth, Africa has a real chance to follow the footsteps of” strong economies in Asia,
such as those of China and India). The magazine observed that six of the world’s ten
fastest-growing countries were in Africa. Id.
19. Hopeless
Africa,
ECONOMIST
(May
13,
2000),
http://www.economist.com/node/333429. Unending wars and natural disasters
factored heavily in the magazine’s assessment of the African condition as hopeless.
Id. Since 1980, about 30 wars have been fought in Africa, resulting in millions of
deaths and millions more displaced. See generally WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION,
WORLD REPORT ON VIOLENCE AND HEALTH (Etienne G. Krug et al., eds., 2002).
20. See, e.g., Susan Lund & Arend van Wamelen, Lions on the Move: 10 Things
You Don’t Know about Africa’s Booming Economy, FOREIGN POLICY (Sept. 1, 2012),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/09/01/lions-on-the-move/ (concluding that Africa’s
future looks bright, but that the continent has ways to go to achieve sustainable
progress).
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way forward for African states,21 while others contend that it is about
time African states govern themselves using indigenous political
structures and ideologies that are adapted to modern times.22 Yet others
have analyzed the role of deeply-rooted pre-colonial ethnic institutions
in shaping comparative regional development within African
countries.23 Most recently, former U.S. President, Barack Obama,
advised that Africa “needs strong institutions,” not strongmen.24
Topping it all, some East African leaders have proposed an economic
union, the East African Community (EAC), made up of Burundi,
Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and possibly the newlyindependent South Sudan; collectively, these states are projected to
create an integrated market of about 120 million people.25 This would
create, in market size, the second-largest state, after Nigeria, fourthlargest in Africa, and seventeenth-largest in the world.26
21. Geoffrey E. Schneider, Comparative Institutional Advantage and the
Appropriate Development Model for Sub-Saharan Africa, 37 FORUM FOR SOCIAL
ECONS. 115–24 (2008).
22. DANIEL T. OSABU-KLE, COMPATIBLE CULTURAL DEMOCRACY: THE KEY TO
DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 25 (2000).
23. Stelios Michalopoulos & Elias Papaioannou, Pre-Colonial Ethnic
Institutions and Contemporary African Development, 81 ECONOMETRICA 113–52
(2013) (analyzing the role of deeply-rooted pre-colonial ethnic institutions in shaping
comparative regional development within African countries).
24. Obama, supra note 1.
25. East
African
Community
(EAC),
AFRICAN
UNION,
http://www.au.int/en/recs/eac (last visited Apr. 12, 2017); Conor Gaffey, Uganda’s
Museveni Wants to Create an East African Superstate, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 10, 2016),
http://www.newsweek.com/ugandas-museveni-wants-create-east-african-superstate424975. The treaty establishing the EAC was signed in 1999. But the history of the
organization goes back to 1917 when Kenya and Uganda, still dependent countries,
formed a Customs Union that Tanganyika (later on Tanzania) joined in 1927. History
of the EAC, EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY, http://www.eac.int/about/EAC-history (last
visited Apr. 12, 2017).
26. See Gaffey, supra note 25. The context for Yoweri Museveni’s views was a
news conference ahead of presidential elections in Uganda on Feb. 18, 2016, which
Museveni, Uganda’s leader since 1986, won, extending his 30-year rule. But this is a
consistent theme for Museveni who indicated, circa 2011, while commenting on the
importance of economic integration in East Africa, that “East Africa would ensure the
future of black people more than just Uganda. Uganda is going to develop, Uganda is
going to become a modern country—but a small one.” Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni in
Profile, BBC NEWS AFRICA (May 12, 2011), www.bbc.com/news/world-africa12421747.
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This Article joins the list of studies on the debate regarding
appropriate governance structure for development in Africa in the 21st
century, using the Senegambia Confederation (1982-1989) as a case
study. Its argument is as follows: Redrawing Africa’s artificial borders
is necessary to achieve development in the continent in this century;
however, that option is a grand strategy that is far-fetched even as the
need for development within the region remains as dire as ever. For the
time being, while still keeping that ultimate option in mind, more
midrange measures are worth trying. Within the context of these
midrange measures, a proper formula for governance and development
in Africa, in this Article conveniently equated with political
engineering, must go hand in hand with attitudinal changes (cultural
engineering), plus political (or governmental) performance. Each of
these key terms is elaborated later below.
Senegal and Gambia are among the small number of politically
stable countries in Africa; Senegal is one of the few countries in Africa
that has never experienced a military takeover of power.27 Gambia was
not so lucky. There, the military, “the internal opponent most feared by
African rulers,”28 seized power in 1994, after a failed attempt in 1981.29
However, the relative stability of the two states obscures issues,
including deficiencies in political engineering, cultural engineering,
and governmental performance, which the failure of the Senegambia
Confederation importantly brings to the fore.
The ensuing conversation falls into three main sections. The first is
a historical background account necessary to properly understand the
politics of Senegambia, including past events that ineluctably shaped
those politics.30 The second is a description of the Senegambia
confederation that ties the political experiment to the economic
difficulties in Africa during the 1980s. The third is a delineation of
several lessons to be drawn from the failure of the political experiment
regarding appropriate structures for economic development and
prospects for the future.
27. Danielle Resnick, Lessons from Africa’s Democratic Upheavals, UNITED
NATIONS UNIVERSITY (Apr. 26, 2012), http://unu.edu/publications/articles/lessonsfrom-africa-s-democratic-upheavals.html.
28. Jackson & Rosberg, supra note 17, at 8.
29. See infra notes 136, 170, and 190.
30. See FRANK L. WILSON, CONCEPTS AND ISSUES IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS:
AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 17 (1996).
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Background histories are important because every story has a
starting point, and past events have a tendency to shape contemporary
politics.31 A conceivable way to approach the conversation, which this
section adopts, is to survey colonial attitudes toward development in
Senegambia, including efforts made, or lack thereof, to integrate
Senegal and Gambia before their respective independences in the
1960s. But first, a statement on basic data regarding the two countries.
A. Basic Data Relating to Senegal and Gambia
Senegal is a state which surrounds Gambia on three sides. Senegal
is bordered on the north by Mauritania, on the south by Guinea and
Guinea-Bissau, on the east by Mali, and on the west by the Atlantic
Ocean.32 Like its neighbor Gambia, Senegal is named after River
Senegal, which courses through the country. 33 Similarly, the
Casamance region within Senegal is named after the River Casamance,
south of the Gambian River.34 The Casamance region campaigned for
a separate state predating the independence of Senegal. 35 Senegal is a
land of 79,951 square miles, slightly smaller in land area than South
Dakota in the United States,36 with a population of nearly 16 million

31. Id.
32. Senegal, INFOPLEASE, http://www.infoplease.com/country/senegal.html
(last visited May 01, 2017) [hereinafter Senegal, INFOPLEASE].
33. Senegal,
COUNTRIES
AND
THEIR
CULTURES,
http://www.everyculture.com/Sa-Th/Senegal.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2017) (As the
story goes, the country takes its name from River Senegal, in turn, an adaptation of
the Wolof term Sunugal, meaning “our dugout canoe,” colloquially “we are all in the
same boat.”).
34. Casamance Region, Senegal, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Sept. 28, 2006),
https://www.britannica.com/place/Casamance.
35. See, e.g., Toma Serna, Casamance: Neither War nor Peace, INSIGHT ON
CONFLICT (Dec. 9, 2015), https://www.insightonconflict.org/blog/2015/12/
casamance-neither-war-nor-peace/; AÏSSATOU FALL, UNDERSTANDING THE
CASAMANCE CONFLICT: A BACKGROUND MONOGRAPH NO. 7 (Kofi Annan Int’l
Peacekeeping Training Ctr ed., 2011).
36. Senegal, INFOPLEASE supra note 32.
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residents.37 It is a predominantly rural country of limited natural
resources whose main sources of foreign exchange are agriculture (fish,
peanuts, and cotton), phosphate, and increasingly, tourism.38 In 2015,
the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) was nearly $14 billion
USD, accounting for 0.02 percent of the world economy.39
Senegal gained independence from France in June of 1960 as part
of the Mali Federation (joining Senegal and then French Soudan) and
in its own right as a separate entity in August of the same year,
following its withdrawal from the federation.40 However, the date
Senegalese citizens observe as their “national” day is April 4, 1960, the
date France signed the transfer of power instrument of the Mali
Federation.41 French presence in Senegal dates back to the seventeenth
century and includes milestones dates such as 1638 when the French
built their first trading station at the mouth of the Senegal River; 1659
when they founded Saint Louis (soon to become a key slave trading
port) at the mouth of the same river; 1677 when they took over the
island of Goree, takeoff points for slaves shipped into the New World
during the Middle Passage; 1895 when Senegal became part of French
West Africa;42 and 1946 when, together with other French colonies in
West Africa, Senegal became an overseas territory of France.43

37. Senegal
Population
(Live),
WORLDOMETERS,
http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/senegal-population/ (last visited
Apr.
12,
2017);
Senegal,
THE
WORLD
FACTBOOK,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sg.html
(last
visited May 01, 2017).
38. Senegal,
WORLDMARK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NATIONS
(2007),
http://www.encyclopedia.com/places/africa/senegal-political-geography/senegal.
39. Senegal GDP, TRADING ECONOMICS, www.tradingeconomics.com/
senegal/gdp (last visited May 01, 2017).
40. See Senegal: History, INFOPLEASE, http://www.infoplease.com/
encyclopedia/world/senegal-country-africa-history.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2017).
41. See Senegal, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 37.
42. Senegal: History, supra note 40; History of Senegal, HISTORY WORLD,
http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/plaintexthistories.asp?historyid=ac64
(last
visited Apr. 27, 2017).
43. See ROBERT ALDRICH, GREATER FRANCE: A HISTORY OF FRENCH
OVERSEAS EXPANSION (1996).
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Since its independence, Senegal has operated a mixed presidentialparliamentary system of government44 bequeathed to it by France. It is
a dual-executive arrangement featuring a president and a prime
minister, each vested with significant decision making powers where,
in some cases, as Senegal arguably exemplifies, “the president has even
greater constitutional powers than the president of the United States,
while the legislature has fewer powers than the U.S. Congress.” 45 For
much of its history after independence, Senegal operated a one-party
system dominated by the Parti Socialiste du Sénégal (Socialist Party of
Senegal).46 The situation changed in 1976 when the government
allowed other political parties to compete for power, although a true
multiparty system evolved only beginning in April of 1981 when
lingering restrictions on multiparty competition were lifted.47
Senegal is a unitary state of one central government and fourteen
regions, plus numerous local governments.48 The fourteen regions are:
Dakar, Diourbel, Fatick, Kaffrine, Kaolack, Kédougou, Kolda, Louga,
Matam, Saint-Louis, Sédhiou, Tambacounda, Thiès, and Ziguinchor.49
Kolda and Ziguinchor are located in the Casamance province,50 site of
the conflict that forms a flashpoint in Senegalese politics,51 and to
which we return shortly. Senegal is made up of about seventeen ethnic
groups,52 among them, in order of numerical strength: the Wolof,
44. On this system of government, see MICHAEL J. SODARO, COMPARATIVE
POLITICS: A GLOBAL INTRODUCTION 203–05 (3d ed. 2008).
45. Id. at 203.
46. See Marilyn Schoenle, Senegalese Politics and the Socialist Party, PREZI
(Dec. 3, 2014), https://prezi.com/agcm8eeyhgjm/senegalese-politics-and-thesocialist-party/; John Farmer, Democratic Party Assumes Office as President of
Senegal,
WORLD
SOCIALIST
WEB
SITE
(Apr.
5,
2000),
https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2000/04/sene-a05.html.
47. See Christof Hartmann, Senegal’s Party System: The Limits of Formal
Regulation, 17 DEMOCRATIZATION 769–86 (2010).
48. Senegal: Government and Society, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/place/Senegal/Government-and-society (last visited Apr.
12, 2017).
49. Regions
of
Senegal,
STATOIDS
(June
30,
2015),
http://www.statoids.com/usn.html.
50. See FALL, supra note 35, at 8 (map).
51. See FALL, supra note 35.
52. An ethnic group is “a named social category of people based on subjective
perceptions of shared attributes, such as common ancestry or heritage, history,
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making up over 43 percent of the population; the Pular, accounting for
nearly 24 percent; the Serer (closely related to the Wolof), nearly 15
percent; the Diola, nearly 4 percent (but forming about 60 percent of
the Casamance); and the Mandinka or Malinké (some of whom are
found in the Casamance), approximately 3 percent.53
Regarding the Casamance conflict, the dispute pits the Diola
people, the dominant ethnic group in Casamance, agitating for separate
statehood from Senegal against the Senegalese government which is
determined to keep the state unified.54 On the Casamance side, the face
of the campaign for independence is the Movement des Forces
Democratiques de la Casamance (MFDC), whose agitation for regional
autonomy, dating back to 1947, was initially peaceful but turned violent
in 1982.55 The Diolas, the moving force behind the agitation, base their
struggle on factors that include the “historical autonomy of the
Casamance province.”56 Casamance had a strategic value for European
colonialists as a “trading point for slaves, wax, ivory, and rice.”57
Topographically, the region differs in important respects from the rest
of Senegal: “it gets more rain,” while its landscapes, including areas of
rain forest, and beaches “are a major tourist attraction.”58 Moreover,
Casamance culture “leans more towards the south and Guinea, rather
than the north of Senegal itself.”59 The French secured the territory from
the Portuguese in exchange for another territory.60

homeland, and language that set its people apart from other groups.” JAMES PEOPLE
& GARRICK BAILEY, HUMANITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY
389 (9th ed. 2012). Unlike other cleavages, such as religion, ethnicity “cut[s] across
socioeconomic class differences, drawing members from all strata of the population.”
Id.
53. Senegal, WORLDMARK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NATIONS, supra note 38; FALL,
supra note 35, at 8.
54. See FALL, supra note 35, passim.
55. Id. at 4. The MFDC was founded in Mar. 1947 by Emile Badiane, a
politician and Casamance native. It evolved as a political party that worked for “more
recognition, development and inclusion of the Casamance” people in post-colonial
Senegal. Id. at 17 n.43.
56. Id. at. 4.
57. Id. at 6.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 8.
60. Id. at 5.
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Casamance had an experience of colonialism different from the rest
of Senegal. Because of violent resistance against French rule by the
Diolas, the region was managed as a colony on its own, separate from
the rest of Senegal from 1854 to 1939 and was not integrated with the
rest of the state until the end of the colonial period.61 Their decentralized
and egalitarian character, vis-à-vis the centralized hierarchical structure
of the rest of Senegal to the North, together with their history of
resistance to foreign rule, makes the Diolas non-amenable to easy
governance.62
Lastly, despite its ethnic diversity, Senegalese society “exhibits a
generally high degree of cultural homogeneity to which the Casamance
[region] seems to be an exception.”63 And, although part of a heavily
Muslim state, the region is minimally Islamized with a substantial
number of Christians and/or adherents of traditional religions.64
Gambia is surrounded by Senegal in all geographic corners, except
for the respite of an outlet to the Atlantic Ocean on the West65 that
blocks complete encirclement—a feature on the map that gives the
country the look of “a banana in the teeth of Senegal.” 66 It is named

61. Id. at 6.
62. Id. at 5, n.7, 6, and 15.
63. Id. at 8.
64. Id. at 8–9.
65. See
West
Africa
Map,
MAPS
OF
THE
WORLD,
http://www.mapsofworld.com/africa/regions/western-africa-map.html (last visited
Mar. 11, 2017).
66. Christopher W. Nordlinger, Africa’s Senegambia: A Confederation More of
Form than Substance, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 6, 1983),
http://www.csmonitor.com/1983/0106/010652.html. Given the landlocked character
of many countries in Africa, referred to in the introduction of this Article,
encirclement inside the borders of another country is a geopolitical feature not unique
to Gambia. Instead, more or less similarly-situated countries in Africa include
Lesotho, and Swaziland, both of which are enclaves within South Africa; Malawi,
surrounded by Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia; and Cabinda, an Angolan
territory sandwiched in between the Republic of Congo, and the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, formerly Zaïre. See Southern Africa Region Map, MAPS OF WORLD,
http://www.mapsofworld.com/africa/regions/southern-africa-map.html (last visited
Mar. 11, 2017) (Lesotho and Swaziland); Malawi, WORLD ATLAS,
http://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/africa/mw.htm (last visited Mar. 11,
2017); Ken Jennings, Cabinda: The Tiny Oil-Rich Corner of Africa Everyone’s
Fighting
For,
CONDE
NAST
TRAVELER
(June
1,
2016),

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2017

15

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 47, No. 2 [2017], Art. 6
AkaCameraReady final (Do Not Delete)

7/5/2017 10:05 AM

124 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47
after River Gambia, which courses through the state for 200 miles and
connects to the Atlantic Ocean.67 Gambia is 4,363 square miles, about
twice the land area of Delaware State in the United States,68 with a
population in 2016 of almost 2.1 million people.69
Like Senegal, Gambia is a state of limited natural resources whose
main sources of foreign exchange are agriculture (including livestock),
tourism, informal trade around its borders involving re-exports of
products (that its neighbors regard as smuggling), remittances from
Gambians abroad, and foreign assistance.70 In 2014, the year for which
information is available, Gambia had a GDP of approximately $85
million USD, accounting for less than 0.01 percent of the world
economy.71
Gambia gained independence from the United Kingdom on
February 18, 1965, after 72 years of British colonial control, counting
from 1893 when Britain imposed indirect rule on the territory.72 It
became a republic in 1970 in a move to eliminate or minimize lingering
vestiges of its British colonial past, most notably retention of the Queen
http://www.cntraveler.com/stories/2016-06-01/cabinda-the-tiny-oil-rich-corner-ofafrica.
67. See generally Gambia, INFOPLEASE.COM, http://www.infoplease.com/
country/gambia.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2017). There was something about colonial
authorities and rivers. Although some overlap occurred in their spheres of influence,
French trade centered around key landmarks that include the Senegal River, while
English trade centered on the Gambian River. Edmun B. Richmond, Senegambia and
the Confederation: History, Expectations, and Disillusions, 10 J. THIRD WORLD
STUD. 172, 176 (1993).
68. Gambia, supra note 67.
69. Gambia
Population
(Live),
WORLDOMETERS,
http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/gambiapopulation/ (last visited
Mar. 12, 2017); The Gambia, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (Jan. 12, 2017),
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/ga.html.
70. See Gambian GDP Annual Growth Rate, TRADING ECONOMICS,
www.tradingeconomics.com/gambia/gap-growth-annual (last visited Mar. 12, 2017);
Senegal
GDP
Annual
Growth
Rate,
TRADING
ECONOMICS,
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/senegal/gdp-growth-annual (last visited Mar. 12,
2017).
71. Gambia
GDP
1966-2016,
TRADING
ECONOMICS,
www.tradingeconomics.com/gambia/gdp (last visited Mar. 12, 2017).
72. Colonial System of Administration in Gambia, Indirect Rule in the Gambia
Protectorate, ACCESS GAMBIA, http://www.accessgambia.com/information/colonialgovernment.html (last visited May 3, 2017).
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of England as governor-general of the state.73 British presence in the
land dates back to 1587 when British traders visited the area,74 and
subsequently established the colony of Gambia in 1816.75 Highlights of
British presence include a conference in Paris in 1889 where France
ceded control of the Gambia River to the U.K.,76 and declaration of the
colony as a protectorate in 1900.77
Following independence, Gambia operated a parliamentary system
of government for several years before changing into a modified
presidential system in the aftermath of its achievement of republican
status in 1970.78 For the first thirty years after independence, Gambia
was a multiparty state where the ruling party held sway,79 but only
nominally multiparty since the democratic experiment that has followed
the successful military coup in 1994. That era came to a close on
January 19, 2017, with the inauguration of Adama Barrow as Gambia’s
third president.80 Gambia is home to multiple ethnic groups, including
73. Gambia, The History, COMMONWEALTH, thecommonwealth.org/ourmember-countries/gambia/history (last visited Mar. 12, 2017).
74. Colonial History, GAMBIA.COM, http://www.ttag.gm/colonial-history.php
(last visited Mar. 12, 2017).
75. GODFREY MWAKIKAGILE, ETHNIC DIVERSITY AND INTEGRATION IN THE
GAMBIA: THE LAND, THE PEOPLE, AND THE CULTURE 14 (2010).
76. History: Precolonial History, British Protectorate, ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/place/The-Gambia/History (last visited
Mar. 3, 2017).
77. MWAKIKAGILE, supra note 75, at 15.
78. OUSMAN A.S. JAMMEH, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE GAMBIA: 19652010, 5 (2011) (observing that although it contains features of a conventional
presidential system, Gambia’s constitutional order and electoral system lack the full
measure of separation of powers found in the classic presidential system). For features
distinguishing the parliamentary and presidential electoral systems, see SODARO,
supra note 44, at 194–203. One key anchor of that distinction is that in the
parliamentary system, executive power is divided between a president who holds
ceremonial powers as head of state and a prime minister vested with real powers as
head of government, whereas in a presidential system, the president is both head of
state and head of government. See id. at 194, 196.
79. MWAKIKAGILE, supra note 75, at 21.
80. See Tim Cocks, Gambia’s New President Adama Barrow Inaugurated after
Being Forced into Exile by Yahya Jammeh, INDEPENDENT (Feb. 18, 2017, 23:50
GMT), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/gambia-president-adamabarrow-returns-from-exile-senegal-yahya-jammeh-a7587966.html; Gambia’s Yahya
Jammeh Loses Election to Adama Barrow, AL JAZEERA (Dec. 2, 2016),

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2017

17

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 47, No. 2 [2017], Art. 6
AkaCameraReady final (Do Not Delete)

7/5/2017 10:05 AM

126 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47
in order of numerousness: the Mandinka or Malinké, forming 42
percent of the population; the Fula, 18 percent; the Wolof, 16 percent;
the Jola, 10 percent; the Seraluleh, 7 percent; and the Serer, little over
3 percent.81 Gambia is a unitary state made up of one central
government, five regions, two municipalities,82 and numerous local
governments. The regions are West Coast River, Lower River, North
River, Central River, and Upper River.83 The two municipalities are
Banjul and Kanifing.84
Africa is a region with an immense ethnic consciousness, indicated
most notably by being inhabited by about 2,000 ethnic groups.85
Gambia and Senegal have multiple ethnic nationalities in common,
including the Wolof, the Serer, and the Malinké, among others.86 The
breakdown of Senegal’s four leaders since the state’s independence,
including the ethnic identity of each leader, is as follows: Léopold S.
Senghor, Serer; Abdou Diouf, Wolof; Abdoulaye Wade, Wolof; and
Macky Sall, Pular.87 Gambia has had three leaders since its
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/gambia-yahya-jammeh-loses-electionadama-barrow-161202130519550.html. Barrow is Gambia’s third president since
independence after Dawda K. Jawara (1970-94, but before then from 1965 until 1970
as prime minister), and Yahya Jammeh (1996-2017, with the first two years before
1996
as
military
dictator).
See
Gambia,
The,
RULERS,
http://www.rulers.org/rulg1.html#gambia (last visited May 3, 2017).
81. The Gambia, WORLDMARK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NATIONS (2007),
http://www.encyclopedia.com/places/africa/gambian-political-geography/gambia;
The Gambia, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 69.
82. Overview:
UNICEF
in
the
Gambia,
UNICEF,
http://www.unicef.org/gambia/overview.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2017).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Christine Mungai, Africa’s Borders Split Over 177 Ethnic Groups and Their
‘Real’ Lines Aren’t Where You Think, MAIL & GUARDIAN AFR. (Jan. 13, 2015),
http://mgafrica.com/article/2015-01-09-africas-real-borders-are-not-where-youthink.
86. See, e.g., Ebou Momar Taal, Senegambian Ethnic Groups: Common Origins
and Cultural Affinities Factors and Forces of National Unity, Peace and Stability,
POINT (Apr. 22, 2010), http://thepoint.gm/africa/gambia/article/senegambian-ethnicgroups-common-origins-and-cultural-affinities-factors-and-forces-of-national-unit.
87. See STEPHEN SNOOK ET AL., DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND
GOVERNANCE OF ASSESSMENT OF SENEGAL: FINAL REPORT 4–5 (USAID, 2013),
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnaec828.pdf (commenting on “ethnicity and ethnic
relations in Senegal”). The takeaway from the discussion is that, for the most part,
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independence: Dawda K. Jawara, who is Wolof;88 Yahya Jammeh, who
is Jola;89 and Barrow, who is Fula.90 In Africa, a leader’s ethnic identity
is important because of the tendency of other groups to accuse the
ethnic group whose member is at the helm of “ethnic domination,”
especially when, as is often the case, the leader skews distribution of
limited infrastructure and government benefits to favor his own ethnic
group at the expense of other groups.91
B. Colonial Attitudes toward Development in Senegambia
Development is the broad process of using human and natural
resources (people and things) to produce more wealth and build a better
system of production92 in an attempt to improve the quality of life of

unlike in many other states in Africa, ethnic relations among Senegal’s major ethnic
groups, including those of the state’s leaders, “are marked by social harmony.” Id. at
2–3. Various reasons accounting for this harmony, according to scholars, include: “the
nation-building policies of the first head of state, Léopold Sedar Senghor, the impact
of the Wolof language, intermarriage, the cosmopolitanism of the city of Dakar . . . a
tradition of democracy and Pan-Africanism[,]” and the mellowing influence of Islam
made possible by its expression through brotherhoods. Id. at 3.
88. ALEXANDER KEESE, ETHNICITY AND THE COLONIAL STATE: FINDING AND
REPRESENTING GROUP IDENTIFICATION IN A COASTAL WEST AFRICAN AND GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVE: 1850-1960 151 (2015) (suggesting that Jawara is Wolof).
89. Yahya Jammeh (former President of The Gambia), Background
Information, ACCESS GAMBIA, http://www.accessgambia.com/information/yahyajammeh.html (last visited May 3, 2017).
90. See Gambia: Gambia’s UDP Says It Has Nominated a “Fulani Real Estate
Businessman” as a Presidential Candidate!, FREEDOM NEWSPAPER ONLINE (Feb. 10,
2017),
http://www.freedomnewspaper.com/gambia-gambias-udp-says-it-hasnominated-a-fulani-real-estate-businessman-as-a-presidential-candidate/.
The
acronym UDP stands for the United Democratic Party, a coalition of seven opposition
parties that fielded Barrow as their common candidate for president in the election
against longtime ruler Yahya Jammeh, held Dec. 1, 2016, that Jammeh lost, scoring
37 percent of all votes cast to Barrow’s 45 percent. Lea Albrecht, Adama Barrow:
The Gambia’s Next President, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Jan. 20, 2017),
http://www.dw.com/en/adama-barrow-the-gambias-next-president/a-36620649.
91. See generally GODFREY MWAKIKAGILE, ETHNIC POLITICS IN KENYA AND
NIGERIA (2001). Cf. STEPHEN SNOOK ET AL., supra note 87, at 2 (pointing out that in
Senegal, “[u]nlike in other parts of Africa, ethnic tensions have had little influence on
politics.”).
92. DAVIDSON, supra note 9, at 224.
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citizens.93 It is “the process by which people create and recreate
themselves and their life circumstances to realize higher levels of
civilization in accordance with their own choices and values.”94
Scholars go as far as to equate development with democracy.95 As
Professor Ake seminally argued, “[D]emocracy is part of what
development is about . . . .”96 Ake dispelled the notion that
development was positively correlated with the type of authoritarianism
practiced in newly industrialized countries of East Asia, such as China,
Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan.97 Instead, “because
democracy is part of the very meaning of political development . . . [a]
case for authoritarianism’s being positively correlated to development
does not really arise . . . .”98
The essence of this definition of development is that, though often
conveniently measured in material economic terms, all development
ranges well beyond economic growth to critically embrace political and
social dimensions.99 Consistent with this larger notion, development
took place in precolonial Africa,100 some under political structures
different from latter-day colonial institutions.101 Precolonial Africa
consisted of centralized political systems, decentralized political
systems, and in-between political systems that combined features of the
centralized and decentralized systems.102 The Wolof people utilized a
93. F.I. Kabuya, Development Ideas in Post-Independence: Sub-Saharan
Africa, 3 J. DEV. & AGRIC. ECONS. 2 (Jan. 2011).
94. AKE, supra note 5, at 125.
95. See id. passim.
96. Id. at 158.
97. Id. at 94, 127–29, 156–68.
98. Id. at 127. Ake explains that, following independence, many African leaders
chose to inherit, unchanged, the political system bequeathed to them by the departing
colonial authorities, rather than transform that system “in accordance with the
democratic aspirations of the nationalist movement.” Id. at 116.
99. See DAVIDSON, supra note 9, at 225 (highlighting several key requirements
embedded in the process of development); see also AKE, supra note 5, at 16.
100. See DAVIDSON, supra note 9, at 265.
101. See WALTER RODNEY, HOW EUROPE UNDERDEVELOPED AFRICA 69 (1981)
(discussing “[h]ow Africa Developed before the Coming of the Europeans—Up to the
Fifteenth Century.”). See also id. at 73–92 (commenting on Africa’s contribution to
European capitalist development during the precolonial period).
102. See Charles Lumpkins, Precolonial African Politics and Government,
PENN
STATE
UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE
OF
LIBERAL
ARTS,
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centralized system, ruled by a king (called burba, meaning ruler) who
exercised both political and religious power.103 At the height of its
reign, circa the fourteen century, the Wolof Empire developed satellite
states, most notably Cayor.104 In contrast, the Diolas were egalitarian
people who rejected and still reject centralized authority.105 The same
is true of the Mandinkos whose political system consisted of nominal
kingdoms rooted in villages, and governed by elders.106 Mandinko
“kings” were non-absolute leaders who shared taxes they collected with
village heads and made major decisions, such as declarations of war,
that were subject to approval by a council of elders from leading
families in the kingdom.107 An example of a system in-between these
two types is the Mandinkos, an egalitarian people, whose origins date
back to Manding (Kangaba), one of the states of ancient Mali Empire.108
http://elearning.la.psu.edu/afam/100/lesson-2-part1/african-roots-of-africanamerican-life-under-slavery/pre-colonial-african-politics-and-government
(last
visited Apr. 12, 2017); Otumfuo Osei Tutu II, Traditional Sys. of Governance and the
Mod. St, Keynote Address at the Fourth Afr. Dev. F., Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (Oct. 12,
2004),
http://dspace.africaportal.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/10101/1/
Traditional%20Systems%20of%20Governance%20and%20the%20Modern%20Stat
e.pdf?1; Module Twenty Three, Activity Two: History of Senegal, EXPLORING AFRICA,
http://exploringafrica.matrix.msu.edu/module-twenty-three-activity-two/ (last visited
May 3, 2017).
103. Wolof
Empire,
ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA
(1998),
https://www.britannica.com/place/Wolof-empire.
104. Id.
105. See supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text.
106. The Mandinko of The Gambia, 12 CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS FOUNDATION
(2000), http://www.crf-usa.org/bill-of-rights-in-action/bria-12-1-c-the-mandinko-ofthe-gambia.
107. Id. This feature calls to mind the “king in every man” republicanism of the
Igbo people in present-day Nigeria who organized themselves into more than 2,000
kingless villages. See RICHARD N. HENDERSON, THE KING IN EVERY MAN:
EVOLUTIONARY TRENDS IN ONITSHA IBO SOCIETY AND CULTURE, passim (1972);
ELIZABETH ISICHEI, THE IBO PEOPLE AND THE EUROPEANS: THE GENESIS OF A
RELATIONSHIP—TO 1906 47 (1973).
108. (Mandingo) Mandinka Tribe in Gambia, ACCESS GAMBIA,
http://www.accessgambia.com/information/mandinka.html (last visited May 3,
2017). Outside Senegambia, an example of such in-between governmental
arrangements occurred in some parts of Yorubaland in present-day Nigeria that were
“centralized with some measure of republicanism.” Mojeed Olujinmi A. Alabi, Law
Making in Pre-Colonial Yorubaland, in THE YORUBA IN TRANSITION: HISTORY,
VALUES, AND MODERNITY 112, 122 (Toyin Falola & Ann Genova, eds., 2006).
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Compared to precolonial Africa, little development took place in
colonial Africa, including the areas known today as Senegal and
Gambia. Wherever it existed in Africa, colonialism was “imposed by
violence, and maintained by its potential capacity for violence.”109 As
a corollary, rather than being vehicles for galvanizing development,
colonial institutions were primarily “structures of exploitation,
despotism, and degradation.”110 European colonizers had no real plan
to develop their African colonies beyond utilizing their raw materials
for European industrialization.111 France in particular did a poor job
integrating the Casamance into the rest of Senegal, to the detriment of
nation-building in the post-independence period.112
Next to the territories that became Senegal and Gambia, “[t]he
logical thing for any pragmatic state-building enterprise would have
been to” make the two separate territories one country.113 French and
British colonial authorities recognized the impediments Gambia’s
location posed, as a semi-enclave within Senegal, to the progress of the
two countries.114 Both colonizers made feeble attempts to fix the
109. ELIZABETH ISICHEI, A HISTORY OF THE IGBO PEOPLE 119 (1976). See also
Philip C. Aka, The Military, Globalization, and Human Rights in Africa, 18 J. HUM.
RTS. 361, 379 (2002) (observing that “[t]he entire architecture of colonial rule . . . was
built and maintained solely and completely on naked force designed to crush any and
every ‘native’ resistance to external domination.”).
110. Robert Fatton, Jr., Liberal Democracy in Africa, 105 POL. SCI. Q. 455, 457
(1990).
111. See, e.g., D.K. Fieldhouse, Colonialism: Economic Aspects,
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (2008),
http://www.encyclopedia.com/history/modern-europe/ancient-history-middle-agesand-feudalism/colonialism.
112. See supra note 61 and accompanying text; see also Government, in
NIGERIA: A COUNTRY STUDY (Helen Chapin Metz, ed., 1991) (A similar story took
place in Nigeria where, through their policy of indirect rule, British colonial
authorities perpetrated the separate development of the northern and southern portions
of the country, with negative consequences for political stability decades after
independence.).
113. Nicodemus Fru Awasom, The Sene-Gambia in Historical and
Contemporary Perspectives, in NATION-STATES AND THE CHALLENGES OF
REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN WEST AFRICA: THE CASE OF THE GAMBIA 47 (Siga
Fatima Jagne, ed., 2010).
114. See id. For Senegal, an independent Gambia would obstruct
communication between northern and southern Senegal and minimize utilization of
the navigable River Gambia as a route into the interior as far as Mali. In this sense,
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problem, but neither went far enough. During the second half of the
nineteenth century, there was a proposal, ultimately unsuccessful,
aimed at unifying the region, involving France trading another West
African holding for Gambia.115 There were also informal talks designed
to correct the problem that, in the assessment of one analyst, “focused
on association between the two territories as a technical rather than a
political matter.”116
The overall result was colonial overlords, in important respects,
joined hands to bring Senegal and Gambia together.117 However, they
did not work equally or collaboratively to fix the “banana in the teeth
of Senegal” problem they created by integrating the two territories
before handing over political control.118 Under the concept of selfdevelopment “people either develop themselves, or they do not develop
at all.”119 In other words, little development in the real sense took place
under colonial rule in Senegambia or any other portion of Africa.120

Gambia prevents Senegal from realizing its full economic potentials. For Gambia, its
location inside Senegal and small size create a dependence on Senegal for realizing
its economic development—and security.
115. Richmond, supra note 67, at 177.
116. Awasom, supra note 113, at 47–48.
117. See supra Part II.A. (outlining the basic data relating to Gambia and
Senegal).
118. Jackson & Rosberg, supra note 17, at 14. In their important work,
Professors Jackson and Rosberg maintained that “[a]t independence . . . there
were . . . very few traditional African states to whom sovereignty could revert.
Consequently, there was little choice but to establish independence in terms of the
colonial entities.” They added in a footnote that “French West Africa[,] rather than its
constituent units—Senegal, Mali Upper Volta, Ivory Coast, etc.—could have been
one state had Africans been able to agree to it; Nigeria could have been more than
one.” Id. at 14, n.14. This is implausible. The colonial overlords who created this
problem in the first place were in a much better position to fix it than the nationalist
leaders preoccupied at independence with preserving the fragile unity they garnered
from the decolonization struggle, given the ethnic awareness that was a byproduct of
that struggle.
119. DAVIDSON, supra note 9, at 265.
120. RODNEY, supra note 101, at 93–146 (commenting on factors, including the
slave trade, at the root of African underdevelopment); id. at 147–202 (commenting on
aspects of Africa’s contribution to the capitalist development of Europe, such as
expatriation of African surplus, to the detriment of the continent); and id. at 203–82
(portraying colonialism in itself, including “education for underdevelopment,” and
“development by contradiction,” as “a system for under developing Africa.”).
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Given its scarcity during the colonial era, a hunger for development
gripped Africa following independence. This was dictated, as Julius
Nyerere advised, not just by the need to run while others walked.121 But,
there was also a need to augment the region’s social services that
received inadequate attention during the colonial period, like healthcare
and education.122 However, many of the economies bequeathed to the
new states lacked the capacity needed for any development, whether
political, economic, or social. Historian Basil Davidson delicately
summarized the scenario:
Africa’s economies had been small in scale. They suited the needs
of many hundreds of self-supplying and mostly rural communities.
There had been no industrial revolution, no reliance on the manufacture
of machine-made goods, and no need for imports of good. Being selfreliant, Africans were sheltered from the shocks and strains of the world
market and its fluctuating prices. Now, in the new period of worldwide
industrialism, all that was changed. There could be no going back to the
past.123
One way around this problem was regional economic integration.
This acted as a tool by pooling resources and creating larger markets
that were necessary to stimulate production while growing trade and
investment.124 Arguably this was part of the impetuses behind the
formation of the ECA.125 A pan-Africanist motif signified the
dedication to a “larger unity transcending ethnic and national
differences” and stimulated the formation of the Organization for
African Unity in 1963.126 But there was also an economic objective at
121. See DAVIDSON, supra note 9.
122. Id. at 218. See also ELIZABETH ISICHEI, A HISTORY OF THE IGBO PEOPLE
199 (1976) (As the Nigerian historian Elizabeth Isichei poignantly notes in her work
on Igbo history, “[t]he important thing to the historian of Igboland is the sobering
reflection that after half a century of colonial rule and mission, over 80 percent of the
population was illiterate.”).
123. DAVIDSON, supra note 9, at 218.
124. African Dev. Bank Group, Integration Represents Significant
Opportunities for Landlocked and Small Island Countries of Southern Africa (Oct. 8,
2013),
http://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/integration-representssignificant-opportunities-for-landlocked-and-small-island-countries-of-southernafrica-12338/.
125. See supra notes 11–12.
126. OAU
Charter,
preamble,
May
26,
1963,
http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/key_oau/oau_charter.pdf.
The
organization
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work. Through economic integration, the continent’s fragmented
economies stand a better chance of being transmuted “into one strong,
robust, diversified[,] and resilient economy[,]”127 that is “supported by
a first-class trans-boundary infrastructure; a highly educated, flexible
and mobile workforce; financial capital that is highly mobile; sound
health facilities; and peace and security.”128
III. THE SENEGAMBIA CONFEDERATION AND THE LOCUST YEARS OF
AFRICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
A. Particulars of the Union Agreement
In February of 1982, Senegal and Gambia entered into the
Senegambia Confederation,129 an agreement designed to strengthen
longstanding political and economic ties between the two states that
predated their respective independences.130 Specifically, the
metamorphosed into the African Union, effective 2000. See Constitutive Act of the
Africa
Union
(2000),
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/
ConstitutiveAct_EN.pdf;
AU
in
a
Nutshell,
AFRICAN
UNION,
http://www.au.int/en/about/nutshell.
127. Joe Atta-Mensah II, Africa’s Quest for Deeper Integration, AFRICA UP
CLOSE (Nov. 8, 2013), https://africaupclose.wilsoncenter.org/africas-quest-fordeeper-integration/.
128. Id.
129. See Agreement Between The Republic of the Gambia and the Republic of
Senegal Concerning the Establishment of the Senegambia Confederation, Clause 1
(Dec. 17, 1981), http://www.gambia.dk/senegambia_confederation.html (indicating
that “[b]y this Agreement a Confederation of the Republic of The Gambia and the
Republic of Senegal is constituted with the name of the Senegambia Confederation”)
[hereinafter Senegambia Confederation Agreement]. The name Senegambia has a
long history in the literature on Senegal-Gambia relations. As early as 1765, the
British used the term to refer to their settlements in the two areas, Saint Louis and
Gorée Island in Senegal and James Island in Gambia. The term remained in use until
1783 when, under the Treaty of Versailles, Britain ceded Saint Louis to France. It
came into more vogue or usage beginning in 1982 following the union between
Senegal and Gambia. See Senegambia Origins, ACCESS GAMBIA,
http://www.accessgambia.com/information/senegambia-meaning.html (last visited
Apr. 12, 2017).
130. See JEGGAN C. SENGHOR, THE POLITICS OF SENEGAMBIAN INTEGRATION,
1958-1974 15 (2008); Jeggan C. Senghor, Senegalo-Gambian Relations: Continuities
in the Past and Future, PAMBAZUKA NEWS (May 8, 2012),
http://www.pambazuka.org/governance/senegalo-%E2%80%93-gambian-relations-
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Confederation was designed to (1) integrate armed security forces,
promote economic and monetary cooperation, and coordinate policies
in a number of areas including foreign policy and communications;131
and (2) “establish an institutional framework, consistent with national
sovereignty and democratic principles, within which these [goals] may
be gradually realized.”132 It was the brainchild of Abdou Diouf of
Senegal and Dawda K. Jawara of Gambia,133 then leaders of their
respective countries.134 The Confederation reflected the substance of
the Kaur Declaration, an announcement made by the two leaders on
December 12, 1981.135
Entrance into the Senegambia Confederation took place in the
aftermath of a coup in Gambia that Senegalese troops put down.136 The
continuities-past-and-future (chronicling six phases in Gambian-Senegalese relations,
beginning with the first phase from 1958 to 1967; Senghor points out the Senegambia
Confederation is phase three of these relations).
131. Senegambia Confederation Agreement, supra note 129, preamble.
132. Id.
133. Jawara led Gambia from 1962 to 1994, while Diouf led Senegal from 1981
to 2000. For biographies of the two leaders, see Sir Dawda Kairaba Jawara, President
of The Gambia, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/
biography/Dawda-Kairaba-Jawara; Abdou Diouf, President of Senegal,
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abdou-Diouf
(last visited Apr. 12, 2017).
134. See Senegambia Confederation Agreement, supra note 129.
135. The declaration is named after the city in Senegal where the announcement
was made. Details on this declaration are provided in OMAR A. TOURAY, THE GAMBIA
AND THE WORLD: A HISTORY OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OF AFRICA’S SMALLEST
STATE, 1965-1999 108-09 (2000).
136. See Hassoum Ceesay, 1981 Coup: Tragedy that Befalls The Gambia,
DAILY OBSERVER (Feb. 17, 2015), http://archives.chicagotribune.com/
1981/07/31/page/6/article/coup-in-gambia-reported-quelled; Andrew F. Clark,
Gambia, The: Relations with Senegal, WORLDHISTORY BIZ (Feb. 10, 2015),
http://www.worldhistory.biz/sundries/48777-gambia-the-relations-withsenegal.html; D.L. Chandler, Gambia President Dawda Jawara Ousted from Power
on This Day in 1994, FACE2FACE AFRICA (July 22, 2014),
https://face2faceafrica.com/article/dawda-jawara-the-gambia;
Steve
Fishman,
Gambia: Tiny Silver of a Country Still Shaking after Coup Attempt, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR (Aug. 14, 1981), http://www.csmonitor.com/1981/0814/081452.html;
Associated Press, Coup in Gambia Reported Quelled, CHI. TRIB. (July 31, 1981),
http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1981/07/31/page/6/article/coup-in-gambiareported-quelled. See also Pranay B. Gupte, Gambia Enters Union with Senegal on
Wary Note, NY TIMES (Feb. 1, 1982), http://archives.chicagotribune.com/
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agreement complemented, rather than displaced, membership of the
contracting parties in existing international organizations, including
ECOWAS.137 Moreover, the union was driven by hard realities on the
ground, including an awareness that the two countries “constitute[d] a
single people divided into two States by the vicissitudes of History.”138
The union was greeted with considerable euphoria in the
contracting countries. Gambian President Jawara praised the agreement
as a major step in the movement toward continental unity in Africa.139
For his part, Senegalese President Diouf enthused, in words that
paralleled the language of the agreement, that “[a]round the world,
everyone knows that but for the vicissitudes of colonial history, we,
Senegalese and Gambians, would today be citizens of one and the same
State, for in every respect, we constitute a single people with the same
destiny and with identical aspirations.”140
The Confederation was headed by a President, the “President of the
Republic of Senegal,” who was also commander-in-chief of the two
countries’ armies. The Vice-President was the “President of the
Republic of The Gambia,”141 who retained his position as commanderin-chief of the Gambian army.142 Institutions of the Confederation
included the Defense and Security Council, the Council of Ministers,
1981/07/31/page/6/article/coup-in-gambia-reported-quelled (Ironically, the union
agreement fueled suspicion among critics that, with its political pre-eminence and
much stronger military might, Senegal sought to intervene militarily in Gambia under
the guise of broader cooperation. For its part, Senegal maintained that its goal was
driven by functionalism, designed to engender mutual trust and habits of cooperation
between two neighboring governments.) For a description on functionalism and
international organizations, see Mark F. Imber, Functionalism: International
Organizations, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/
functionalism-international-organizations.
137. See Senegambia Confederation Agreement, supra note 129, preamble
(indicating that the contracting parties are “[r]espectful of” various international law
agreements and commitments, including the Lagos Treaty of 1975 setting up
ECOWAS). For more information on ECOWAS, see supra note 10.
138. Senegambia Confederation Agreement, supra note 129, preamble.
139. Baboucarr Camara & Alieu Ceesay, The Senegambia Confederation: The
Rise and Fall of the Unification, DAILY OBSERVER (Feb. 17, 2015),
https://observergm.com/the-senegambia-confederation-the-rise-and-fall-of-theunification/.
140. Id.
141. Senegambia Confederation Agreement, supra note 129, Clause 6.
142. Id. at Clause 8.
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and the Confederal Parliament.143 The Defense and Security Council
“comprise[d] the President and Vice-President of the Confederation and
such other persons as the President, in agreement with the VicePresident of the Confederation, may determine.”144 The President of
Senegal, who doubled as the President of the Confederation,” headed
this Council.145 “[I]n agreement with the Vice-President,” the President
of the Confederation appointed members of the Council of Ministers.146
Regarding the Confederal Parliament, two-thirds were selected by the
Senegalese National Parliament from among its members, while onethird was selected by the Gambian House of Representatives from
among its members.147 Additionally, both the President and Vice
President could submit to the vote of the Confederal Parliament “any
matter of social, economic, or financial interest to the
Confederation.”148 Under the agreement, when the Confederation
would conclude a treaty, the President of the Confederation negotiated
that treaty “in agreement with the Vice-President.”149 Then, the
President ratified any negotiated treaty, subject to authorization by the
Confederal Parliament and enactment by the individual Confederated
States.150
On September 30, 1989, the Confederation ended seven and a half
years after it began.151 Its twin goals of policy integration in various
areas and establishing an institutional framework for the gradual
realization of the stipulated goals were far from achieved.152 The cause
143. Id. at Clauses 6-9 (President and Vice-President); Clause 9 (Defense and
Security Council); Clause 10 (Council of Ministers); Clauses 11-14 (Confederal
Parliament).
144. Id. at Clause 9.
145. Id.
146. Id. at Clause 10.
147. Id. at Clause 11.
148. Id. at Clause 12.
149. Id. at Clause 16.
150. Id.
151. See TOURAY, supra note 135, at 115. Cf. Senghor, Senegalo-Gambian
Relations: Continuities in the Past and Future, supra note 130 (putting the date of
death as Aug. 29, 1989).
152. See Senegambia Confederation Agreement, supra note 129, preamble.
Little literature exists on the operation of the union agreement before its dissolution
in 1989—e.g., the operation of the Confederal Parliament over the 7½-year timeline,
including the number and identity of laws it issued, among other details. Some

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol47/iss2/6

28

Aka: The Continued Search for Appropriate Structures for Governance an
AkaCameraReady final (Do Not Delete)

2017]

THE SENEGAMBIA CONFEDERATION

7/5/2017 10:05 AM

137

of its death was “serious differences in a number of areas, particularly
in perceptions and expectations as to the end-goal of the new order.”153
One of the serious differences was Gambia’s demand for rotation of the
Confederation presidency, which created friction with a Senegalese
leadership already riled at the slow pace of integration.154
A second was differences in trade policies. Senegal maintained
trade barriers that provided preferential treatment for French goods
imported into the country, whereas Gambia had practically no trade
obstacles.155 These opposing trade policies fueled a large black market
around the Senegal-Gambia border, which brought cheaper
manufactured goods into Senegal.156 For example, the Senegalese
government operated a voucher system known as chit for peanuts, an
agricultural mainstay of Senegalese economy, whereby Senegalese
peanut farmers waited three months to get cash.157 Many farmers who
chose not to wait for this delayed voucher system smuggled their
products to Banjul, where the Gambian government paid in cash.158 The
result was that by 1990, about 20 percent of the Gambian peanut market
was from smuggled Senegalese crops.159
exceptions can be made on this point. See, e.g., TOURAY, supra note 135, at 107–18
(providing extensive discussion on “[t]he birth of the Senegambia confederation”);
Camara & Ceesay, supra note 139 (enumerating eight protocols the contracting
parties unveiled between 1982 and 1983). However, none of this literature included
any work of any of the confederation’s institutions, such as the Confederal Parliament.
The seeming spotlight on this institution is justified by the criticalness of an “effective
government, with centralized administrative and legislative organs” in the definition
of an empirical state able to perform the de facto functions of a national government
exercising effective control (through laws, policies, and regulations) over the people,
organizations, and activities within its territorial jurisdiction. Jackson & Rosberg,
supra note 17, at 5.
153. Senghor, Senegalo-Gambian Relations: Continuities in the Past and
Future, supra note 130.
154. TOURAY, supra note 135, at 115. See also Nancy Benjamin et al.,
Informality, Trade Policies, and Smuggling in West Africa, 30 BORDERLINE STUD.
391–94 (2015); Stephen S. Golub & Ahmadou Aly Mbaye, National Trade Policies
and Smuggling in Africa: The Case of The Gambia and Senegal, 37 WORLD DEV. 595,
598 (2009).
155. Richmond, supra note 67, at 185.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 186.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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A third serious difference that caused the Confederation to end was
sparse support, and much less enthusiasm, for integration. The Gambian
public saw little economic benefit in a political union with Senegal.160
Proceeds from the border trade arising from the black market formed
part of the mainstay of Gambia’s fledgling economy. 161 Therefore,
contrary to Senegalese authorities who viewed the border trade as
illegal smuggling, many Gambians perceived it as lawful “re-export” of
imported goods.162
Fourth and finally, while one of the goals of the Confederation was
the adoption of a common currency,163 a serious difference was that
many Gambians were unwilling to embrace a new monetary
arrangement.164 They did not want an arrangement that would lead to a
replacement of their currency, the dalasi, tied to the British pound
sterling, by the Senegalese currency, the franc (the C.F.A.), similarly
tied to the French franc.165
To recapitulate, the union experiment between Senegal and Gambia
failed because of Gambia’s “unwillingness to compromise its economic
and political independence” vis-à-vis Senegal’s “refusal to continue to
assume Gambian security without corresponding economic and
political concessions.”166 Senegal viewed the political relationship “as
a first step toward closer integration of the two states probably leading
to a federation and ultimately leading to a unitary state of
Senegambia.”167 However, Gambia merely viewed the relationship as

160. See Gupte, supra note 136.
161. Id. Back to 1964, a United Nations report anticipated this problem and
proposed solution for Gambia by way of a qualified customs union. PETER ROBSON,
INTEGRATION, DEVELOPMENT, AND EQUITY: ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN WEST
AFRICA 134–35 (2010). See also Lucie Colvin Phillips et al., The Senegambia
Confederation, Inst. Dev. Anthropology, Binghamton, NY, USAID (Feb. 1987),
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNAAY711.pdf (study sponsored by the U.S. Agency
for Int’l Dev. in 1987 that focused on this same issue).
162. Gupte, supra note 136.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. TOURAY, supra note 135, at 118.
167. Senghor, THE POLITICS OF SENEGAMBIAN INTEGRATION, supra note 130,
at 256 (opinion of then Gambian President Dawda K. Jawara).
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“an expression of the very special relationship existing between the two
countries.”168
Each state felt a national security threat that the Confederation
agreement was designed to cure.169 For Gambia, it was territorial
integrity, whose exigency was underscored by the unsuccessful 1981
coup.170 For Senegal, it was stopping financial losses Senegalese
leaders blamed on Gambia’s lax system of custom duties, the answer to
which Senegalese leaders believed lay in a larger economic and
eventual political union with Gambia.171 To be sure, there were security
considerations embedded in Senegalese calculations. For example,
Senegal authorities worried about Gambia becoming a safe haven for
Senegalese dissidents, including activists in Casamance agitating for
independence.172 However, for Senegal more than for Gambia, an
overriding motivation was economic security.173
B. The Measure as a Product of the Locust Years of African
Economic Development
The Senegambia Confederation was one of the boldest moves
outside of economic integration to create a political structure for
development in Africa. It was a culmination of efforts by Senegal and
Gambia to fashion a tool to facilitate cooperation. In the 1960s, the two
countries commissioned a United Nations report to study the possible

168. Id.
169. See TOURAY, supra note 135, at 100.
170. Id. at 99-100.
171. Id. at 100.
172. See, e.g., FALL, supra note 35, at 3 (pointing out that Gambian territories
“have been used by [Casamance] rebels to launch attacks on the Senegalese Army
posts and Casamance’s populations.”); 1982-89 Senegambia Confederation, GLOBAL
SECURITY, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/africa/gm-history-09.htm
(disclosing that in the wake of the Confederation’s demise, “Senegal accused The
Gambia of allowing the secessionists to use its territory as a transit point for Libyan
and Iraqi weapons, providing a meeting point for representatives of the MFDC,”
arrowhead of the Casamance rebellion, see supra note 55 and accompanying text,
“serving as a base from which the military wing of the MFDC could launch its attacks
on the Lower Casamance,” to name these charges).
173. TOURAY, supra note 135, at 100.
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plans and benefits of their unification.174 It was the second move
involving Senegal, after the short-lived Mali Federation of 19591960,175 a union of eight French colonies in Africa that was left over
from French West Africa.176 The federation by France dated back to
1895 and included: Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire,
Burkina Faso, Benin, and Niger.177 Coming after these French colonial
initiatives, the Senegambia Confederation was a pragmatic union based
on mutual security interests that, for all its seeming brevity, was one of
the longest-lived African unions of its time. For one thing, it outlasted
the Union of Independent African States (UIAS) of 1959 initially
between Ghana and Guinea that Mali joined in 1960.178 The UIAS was
dissolved in 1963 after only four years in existence.179 Most
importantly, the measure was a product of the locust years of African
174. Richmond, supra note 67, at 178; Arnold Hughes & Janet Lewis, Beyond
Francophonie?: The Senegambia Confederation in Retrospect, in STATE AND
SOCIETY IN FRANCOPHONE AFRICA SINCE INDEPENDENCE 229 (Anthony Kirk-Greene
& Daniel Bach, eds., 1995).
175. See Alistair Boddy-Evans, The Federation of Mali, ABOUT EDUCATION
(Jan. 20, 2017), http://africanhistory.about.com/od/mali/a/FedMali.htm; Donn M.
Kurtz, Political Integration in Africa: The Mali Federation, 8 J. MOD. AFR. STUD.
405-24 (1970), http://www.jstor.org/stable/158851; WILLIAM J. FOLTZ, FROM
FRENCH WEST AFRICA TO THE MALI FEDERATION (1965).
176. See generally ALDRICH, supra note 43; FOLTZ, supra note 175.
177. See generally ALDRICH, supra note 43; FOLTZ, supra note 175. Many of
these states bore different names during the colonial period that they changed after
gaining independence. Mali was named French Soudan, Guinea was called French
Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire was named Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso was called Upper Volta,
and Benin was named Dahomey. See Angela Thompsell, The Colonial Names of
African States: Modern African Nations Compared with Their Colonial Names,
THOUGHT CO. (Feb. 4, 2017), https://www.thoughtco.com/colonial-names-of-africanstates-43755.
178. The initiative generated a flurry of commentaries in academic and popular
forums, including: Mark W. DeLancey, The Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union: A
Bibliographic Essay, 9 AFR. STUD. BULL. 35–51 (1966); 3 Nations in African Union,
CHI. DAILY DEFENDER 4 (July 3, 1961); Ghana, Guinea, and Mali Inaugurate New
Union, WASH. POST A9 (July 2, 1961); 3 African Lands Take Unity Step: Ghana,
Guinea, and Mali Sign Charter for New Grouping NY TIMES 9 (Apr. 30, 1961);
Russell Howe, Ghana, Guinea Build Federation Designed to Lure Other States,
WASH. POST A4 (May 23, 1959); The Birth of UIAS, WASH. POST A16 (May 6, 1959);
and Thomas F. Brady, New West Africa Union Sealed by Heads of Ghana and Guinea,
NY TIMES 2 (May 2, 1959).
179. See DeLancey, supra note 178.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol47/iss2/6

32

Aka: The Continued Search for Appropriate Structures for Governance an
AkaCameraReady final (Do Not Delete)

2017]

THE SENEGAMBIA CONFEDERATION

7/5/2017 10:05 AM

141

economic development hallmarked by unrelieved material distress that
set the region negatively apart from the rest of the international
community;180 it took place during the “lost decade” of the 1980s when
Africa lagged hopelessly behind the rest of the world in many policy
areas, including health, education, and general living standards.181
For all of its benefits, the Senegambia Confederation agreement
was a pact of severely unequal partners. By population alone, at the time
of the agreement in 1982, Senegal had over nine times Gambia’s
population.182 Senegal’s population comprised nearly 6 million people
versus Gambia’s population of a little over 648,000 people.183 The
disparity in population size led some critics even from Senegal to liken
the agreement to an annexation disguised as expanded security
cooperation.184 There were indications that Gambians and their leaders
feared losing power, identity, and being utterly dominated by the
Senegalese.185 The unequal-ness of the Confederation was a process
maintained solely by support from elites from both countries. The
Confederation had little popular or grassroots support from citizens
from either country, especially those from Gambia who vehemently
opposed it.186 Some observers took the view that but for the 1981
military coup that Senegalese troops put down, Gambian leader Jawara
would most likely not have entered into the merger agreement.187 With
the initial threat of domination dissipated, the union experiment died as
quickly as it had begun.
180. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
182. See the figures for the two countries under the year 1982 in POPULATION
PYRAMIDS
OF
THE
WORLD
FROM
1950
TO
2010,
https://populationpyramid.net/senegal/1982/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2017); and
POPULATION PYRAMIDS OF THE WORLD FROM 1950 TO 2010,
https://populationpyramid.net/gambia/1982/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2017).
183. See id.
184. See Gupte, supra note 136.
185. Hughes & Lewis, supra note 174, at 236.
186. Id. at 236–37; see also supra notes 160–62 and accompanying text.
187. Cf. Jackson & Rosberg, supra note 17, at 12 (speculating that the episode
so “undermined the security of the Gambian government” as to impel it to enter the
agreement) with Arnold Hughes, The Collapse of the Senegambian Confederation, 30
J. COMMONWEALTH & COMP. POLITICS 200 (Jul. 1992) (opining that “the confidence
of the Gambian government recovered as memories of the coup attempt of 1981
receded and its political authority was reestablished with the electorate.”).
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Given the bonds of geography and ethnic affinity that connect
Senegal and Gambia, the impetus for some kind of integrated union
dates back to the period before independence.188 The result was the
signing of a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the two
countries in January of 1991.189 In the changed atmosphere of the
relationship between Senegal and Gambia after 1989, a successful
military coup took place in 1994 which finally brought the nearly three
decade leadership of Sir Dawda K. Jawara to an end,190 partly because
the Senegalese leadership saw no point in intervening militarily this
time to save Jawara.
IV. TOWARD APPROPRIATE STRUCTURES FOR GOVERNANCE AND
DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA IN THE 21ST CENTURY: FOUR TAKEAWAYS
(OR “SOLUTIONS”) FROM THE CASE STUDY
There are four takeaways or “solutions” that may be gleaned from
the preceding case study on the Senegambia Confederation. The first
revolves around the need to redraw Africa’s artificial boundaries in
order to promote development. However, this could take a long time
during which time frame development must take place within the
present boundaries, whether those borders are natural or artificial (i.e.
arbitrarily determined by former colonial powers).191 Compared to this
first solution, the other three takeaways are less grand. These midrange
measures are: political engineering, which is necessary but by itself
insufficient; political engineering, which must be coupled with cultural
engineering; and political performance, which must be synchronized
with the preceding two factors. In other words, the three midrange
solutions must occur in tandem, rather than sequentially.

188. See SENGHOR, THE POLITICS OF SENEGAMBIAN INTEGRATION, supra note
130, passim.
189. TOURAY, supra note 135, at 116.
190. Howard W. French, In Gambia, New Coup Follows Old Pattern, NY
TIMES (Aug. 28, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/08/28/world/in-gambia-newcoup-follows-old-pattern.html. See John A. Wiseman & Elizabeth Vidler, The July
1994 Coup D’Etat in the Gambia: The End of An Era?, 84 COMMONWEALTH J. INT’L
AFF. 53–65 (2008), for a critical analysis on the coup.
191. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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A. Redraw African’s Artificial Boundaries
The first takeaway in the journey to fashioning appropriate
structures for development in Africa is to redraw the continent’s
arbitrarily fixed boundaries to make them more suited for the work of
development. The simple logic to this solution—and its
attractiveness—lies in the fact that, since the European colonizers
created these unnatural boundaries, all that is needed to fix the problem
is to redraw these boundaries. This grand or overarching solution,
however, assumes too much. One of those excessive assumptions is that
the initial boundary lines can be deciphered. Further, since an
international entity created the problem, we would also need an
international organization to fix the problem.
The problem, though, to illustrate with the doctrine of flux (i.e.,
“everything flows”) is that everything changes and nothing stands
still.192 As the Ionian philosopher, Heraclitus (535-475 B.C.) famously
stated, “[n]o man ever steps in the same river twice, for it’s not
the same river and he’s not the same man.”193 As a corollary, there is
no consensus yet, and it is not clear whether there will ever be a
consensus, on the grand solution involving a redrawing of the
continent’s many artificial boundaries. Some states present today in the
African landscape did not exist in precolonial Africa;194 neither Senegal
nor Gambia featured in the precolonial map of Africa.195 The same is
true of a state like Nigeria, which did not exist in pre-colonial Africa
but whose territory encompasses three major ethnic groups, namely,
Igbo, Hausa-Fulani, and Yoruba, each numerous enough to form an
independent country.196

192. See Tim Rayner, Heraclitus, Change, and Flow, PHIL. FOR CHANGE (Apr.
7, 2008), https://philosophyforchange.wordpress.com/2008/04/07/heraclitus-onchange/.
193. Socrates, Heraclitus (535-475 BCE), CLASSICAL WISDOM WEEKLY (July
17, 2013), http://classicalwisdom.com/heraclitus-535-475-bce/.
194. See
A
Complete
Map
of
Africa,
MAPS
ETC.,
http://etc.usf.edu/maps/galleries/africa/complete/index.php?pageNum_Recordset1=0
&totalRows_Recordset1=86 (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (gallery of 86 maps of Africa,
including snapshots of precolonial period).
195. Id.
196. Philip C. Aka, Human Rights as Conflict Resolution in Africa in the New
Century, 11 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 179, 203–05 (2003).
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B. Political Engineering is Necessary, But Not Sufficient
A second lesson emanating from the case study of the Senegambia
Confederation is that political engineering is necessary for robust
development. As defined here, political engineering is constitutional
engineering, including innovative political structure, and robust
participation in economic integration. We take a close look at each of
these elements, using the relations between Gambia and Senegal as an
example where necessary.
Constitutional engineering is the process wherein political actors
devise a “higher law,” usually embodied in a written document, notably
a constitution.197 It includes elements such as power sharing and
devolution and cleaner (or less corrupt) governments, whether or not
these techniques are enshrined in a charter document.198 Constitutional
engineering calls to mind the advice of President Barack Obama in a
speech he gave to the Ghanaian lawmakers and people during a state
visit to the country in July of 2009, to the effect that Africa “needs
strong institutions,” not strongmen.199 These institutions, he said,
include strong parliaments, honest police forces, independent
judiciaries, independent presses, assertive civil society, and a vibrant
private sector.200 Without these institutions, it is hard to engage in the

197. ZACHARY ELKINS, Constitutional Engineering, in INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL SCIENCE (Bertrand Badie et al. eds., 2016),
http://sk.sagepub.com/reference/intlpoliticalscience/n101.xml. The term engineering
is instructive because engineers are workers who use scientific techniques to design,
create, or build structures such as roads and bridges. See Engineering, MERRIAMWEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/engineering (last visited
Mar. 6, 2017).
198. On this point, the United States comes to mind, where the judiciary helps
to create constitutional law through its rulings. See, e.g., Cornell Univ. Law Sch.,
Constitutional
Law:
An
Overview
LEGAL
INFO.
INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/constitutional_law (last visited Mar. 6, 2017)
(positing that because the Supreme Court of the United States plays “a crucial role in
interpreting the Constitution[,]” constitutional law study within the U.S. “focuses
heavily on Supreme Court rulings.”).
199. Obama, supra note 1.
200. Id.
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nation-building necessary to complete African countries’ emergence
from foreign control.201
In the period since independence, Senegal and Gambia have
unveiled several measures of constitutional engineering, designed to
bring about the governance structure they need to realize
development.202 Since 1962, Senegal introduced several amendments
to its independence constitution, including the 2001 referendum that
culminated in the current constitution.203 Gambia has done pretty much
the same, both under Dawda Jawara’s era and in the period since 1994
under Yahya Jammeh, until his departure from office in January of
2017.204 However, none of these measures of political reform went far
enough.
One indicator for Senegal is the unresolved nation-building trouble
in the Casamance,205 while for Gambia, scarcely improved living
conditions from the Jawara era have been worsened by human rights
abuses under Jammeh since 1994.206 Still on Gambia, although
recognized at home and abroad as a responsible leader who respected
201. Id. (“[J]ust as it is important to emerge from the control of other nations, it
is even more important to build one’s own nation.”).
202. See generally Int’l Inst. for Democracy and Electoral Assistance,
Constitutional
History
of
Senegal,
CONSTITUTION
NET,
http://www.constitutionnet.org/country/constitutional-history-senegal (last visited
Mar. 6, 2017) (referencing Senegal); JAMMEH, supra note 78, passim.
203. See Int’l Inst. for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, supra note 202.
204. See JAMMEH, supra note 78, at 20–36 and 37–59 (dealing, respectively,
with the First Republican Constitution 1970-94, and Second Republican Constitution
since 1997).
205. See Tomas Serna, Senegal’s Southern Conflict: Forgotten but Not Gone,
INSIGHT ON CONFLICT (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.insightonconflict.org/
blog/2016/09/senegals-southern-conflict-forgotten-not-gone/.
206. See, e.g., Gambia, World Report 2016, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/gambia.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2017);
Gambia 2015/2016, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, https://www.amnesty.org/
en/countries/africa/gambia/report-gambia; Jeffrey Smith & Maggie Dwyer, Gambia’s
President is under Pressure to Step Down. Is It Time for a Change?, WASHINGTON
POST
(May
17,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkeycage/wp/2016/05/17/gambian-president-jammeh-is-under-pressure-to-step-down-isit-time-for-a-regime-change/; The Gambia under Yahya Jammeh: 22 Years of
Repression and Rights Violations, MEDIA FOUNDATION FOR WEST AFRICA (July 22,
2016), http://www.mfwa.org/country-highlights/the-gambia-under-yahya-jammeh22-years-of-repression-and-rights-violations/.
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the human rights of his citizens, Jawara was noted for his limited access
to public services, including access to water.207 In contrast, Jammeh,
who is notorious for unpredictability and repressive leadership,
promoted neither human rights nor better access to public services.208
On December 2, 2016, after 22 years in office, the Jammeh era finally
came to an end when the Gambian dictator lost the presidential election
to Adama Barrow, candidate of a coalition of seven parties that ran
against him.209
The examination of political structure as part of political
engineering requires a discussion of whether a confederation was the
proper tool for deepening relations between Senegal and Gambia in the
1980s. Three mutually-exclusive possibilities exist universally
regarding division of governmental powers in any political system,
namely: unitarism, federalism, and confederalism.210 Under unitarism,
ultimate governmental authority rests in the hands of the national or
central government.211 In this system, responsibility for even local
matters, such as education, law enforcement, and land use, is lodged in
the national government.212 Like most states in Africa, both Senegal and
Gambia operate under a unitary system of government.213
Confederalism is the direct opposite of unitarism.214 Ultimate
governmental authority in this system rests in the hands of non-central
entities,215 such as provinces, cantons, or states. A good example would
207. Smith & Dwyer, supra note 206. As a matter of fact, protest over this basic
amenity led to violent clashes with the police weeks before the July 1994 coup which
ended Jawara’s period in office. Id.
208. See id.
209. See Gambia’s Yahya Jammeh Loses Election to Adama Barrow, supra note
80.
210. See STEFFEN W. SCHMIDT ET AL., AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS
TODAY 81–82 (12th ed. 2004) (brief overview of all three systems); Nation and States:
Systems of Government, SPARKNOTES, http://www.sparknotes.com/us-governmentand-politics/political-science/nations-and-states/section4.rhtml (last visited Mar. 6,
2017).
211. SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 210, at 82.
212. Id.
213. See Political Handbook of the World 2014, CQ PRESS,
http://library.cqpress.com/phw/toc.php?source=Political+Handbook+of+the+World
+2014&mode=phw-govtype (last visited Mar. 17, 2017).
214. See SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 210, at 82.
215. Id.
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be the United States under the Articles of Confederation from 178189.216 Under this system, rather than operate with direct control, the
central government must act through the non-centers and “handles only
those matters of common concern expressly delegated to it by the” noncenters.217 Today, independent organizations seeking to achieve a
limited purpose, such as military alliance or multinational peacekeeping
engagements (i.e., the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or even the
United Nations) use this formula.218 The point is that because of its
loose nature vis-à-vis other techniques of power division and
devolution, few real states today use this model.219
Federalism marks a middle ground in-between the “polarities” of
unitarism and confederalism. Compared to a unitary system where the
central government rules supreme, in federalism each level of
government is supreme in the sphere of authority granted to it by a
written constitution, and each can “act directly on the people through
laws and through the actions of elected and appointed governmental
officials.”220 The fact that few countries in Africa have a federalist
system of government testifies to the scarcity of power devolution in
the region.221 Yet worse, due to fear of “instability,” many of the few
nominally federal states in the region, such as Nigeria, operate their
governments in a unitary format.222
Given the facts above, federalism, rather than confederalism,
presented a better system of government for the unification of Gambia
and Senegal. In short, given its unworkability, a confederation was
probably not the most appropriate option for expanding the
216. Nation and States: Systems of Government, supra note 210.
217. SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 210, at 82.
218. See id.
219. See Disadvantages of a Confederation, VIRTUAL KOLLAGE,
http://virtualkollage.blogspot.com/2016/05/disadvantages-of-confederation.html
(last visited Mar. 17, 2017) (outlining the disadvantages of a confederal system of
government).
220. SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 210, at 82.
221. See Political Handbook of the World 2014, supra note 213 (listing about a
dozen African countries as federal systems, including Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South
Africa). See also JACKSON & ROSBERG, supra note 17, at 6 (discussing probing factors
that account for the “lack of sympathy for federalism” in Africa).
222. See Philip C. Aka, Bridging the Gap Between Theory and Practice in
Humanitarian Action: Eight Steps to Humanitarian Wellness in Nigeria, 24
WILLIAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISPUTE RESOLUTION 1, 24–31 (2016).
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longstanding relations between the two countries to their mutual
political and economic benefits.
Finally, we examine robust participation in economic integration as
part of political engineering. ECOWAS is one of eight regional
economic communities in Africa recognized by the African Union, the
association of independent states in Africa that, in 2002, replaced the
Organization of African Unity.223 Both Gambia and Senegal are
founding members of the economic community.224 Additionally,
Gambia is a member of Communauté des Etats Sahélo-Sahariens
(CEN-SAD).225 Formed in February 1983, the organization consists of
28 member countries.226 Quantity is not the only measure of the depth
of commitment to economic integration; quality also counts. This
wisdom mandates an examination of cultural engineering as the next
sub-issue in this discussion.
C. Cultural Engineering is Necessary to Complement Political
Engineering
Optimum results in (economic) development necessitate coupling
of political and cultural engineering.227 Cultural engineering is a
product of attitudinal changes. A key concept of comparative politics
that cultural engineering evokes is political culture, defined as basic
attitudes about political life that are widely shared within a particular

223. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 10.
225. CEN-SAD Celebrates 13th Anniversary, PANAPRESS (Feb. 4, 2011),
http://www.panapress.com/CEN-SAD-celebrates-13th-anniversary—-12-75675229-lang2-index.html.
226. See id. The members include: Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African
Republic, Chad, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea,
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Libya, Liberia, Mali, Morocco, Niger,
Nigeria, Sao Tomé & Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, and
Tunisia. Id.
227. See Ali A. Mazrui, Constitutional Change and Cultural Engineering, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AFRICA: CREATING OPPORTUNITIES, FACING CHALLENGES
19–26 (J. Oloka-Onyango ed., 2001). Mazrui comments on the relationship between
constitutional engineering and cultural engineering. He contends that for restructuring
to take place in Africa—what he calls Afrostroika, a parody of perestroika (or political
restructuring in the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev)—cultural engineering
needs to take place alongside constitutional engineering. Id.
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community.228 Depending on the society in question, these shared
attitudes may include broadly diffused core political values—whether
shaped by secular or religious ideologies— that are divisible into three
clusters, namely: (1) attitudes toward authority, (2) attitudes toward
society, and (3) attitudes toward politics, especially the state. 229 In
matured democracies like the United States, these features of cultural
engineering include institutional elements of democracy, measured as
indicators of progress toward the ideals of democracy.230 These
necessary elements include freedom and equality,231 as well as a
commitment by the government to preserve these rights for all without
discrimination;232 respect of minority rights;233 a system for popular
participation enabling private interest groups to “to meet, organize, plan
strategy, and lobby government for action” without fear of reprisal;234
an independent judiciary that uses its authority to enforce the rule of
law;235 and a cultural commitment to democratic ideals among all levels
of society, evident in shared ideals that include reverence for the
Constitution, pursuit of freedom and equality, respect of minority
rights, and fidelity to the rule of law.236 Development itself, a key term
in this study, also entails—and mandates—attitudinal changes. As
opposed to mere promise or assertion of change, development is a “big
cultural” moment requiring a complex process that entails changes “in
people’s minds as well.”237
Why political engineering by itself, no matter how creative, is not
enough, making attitudes imperative is because, as Professor Donald L.
Horowitz pointed out, those charged with responsibility for
implementing designs “may wish to alter the design to favor

228. See, e.g., SODARO, supra note 44, at 293.
229. Id. at 294–95, 300–04.
230. See LARRY BERMAN & BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, APPROACHING
DEMOCRACY 11-16 (8th ed. 2013).
231. Id. at 8–9.
232. Id. at 14.
233. Id. at 9–10.
234. Id. at 13.
235. Id. at 14–15.
236. Id. at 16.
237. DAVIDSON, supra note 9, at 225.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2017

41

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 47, No. 2 [2017], Art. 6
AkaCameraReady final (Do Not Delete)

7/5/2017 10:05 AM

150 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47
themselves.”238 To be sure, “it is possible to build in safeguards or
tripwires that make alterations difficult or set off alarms when attempts
are made.”239 The downside though is “the looser the design and the
easier the adoption, the easier the alteration as well.”240
Recall President Obama’s speech in 2009 to the Ghanaian
lawmakers and people.241 Obama observed that history is on the side of
people who follow the rule of law, rather than the rule of big men who
“use coups or change constitutions to stay in power.”242 Cultural
engineering is the work of citizens—governors and the governed
alike—engaged in the daunting yet necessary work of conscientiously
building their own nations. This work, necessary to achieve political
and economic development, is guided by the rule of law, rather than the
rule of big men.243
Nigeria, several countries away from Senegambia and a founding
member of ECOWAS, is a good example of what happens where a
plenitude of political reforms on paper are unaccompanied by
attitudinal changes anchored in the rule of law. Beginning with
preparations for its Second Republic in 1979, and in-between military
and civilian regimes until the present day, the country has unveiled
numerous measures of political reforms, including the adoption of new
constitutions.244 Yet, judged by the scandal of corruption and abuse of
238. Donald L. Horowitz, Constitutional Design: Proposals Versus Processes
32 (Dec. 9-11, 1999) (unpublished paper prepared for conference at University of
Notre Dame), http://www3.nd.edu/~kellogg/faculty/research/pdfs/Horowitz.pdf.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
242. Obama, supra note 1.
243. See John Mukum Mbaku, The Rule of Law and Poverty Eradication in
Africa, 13 J. AFRICAN & ASIAN STUD. 530, 533 (2014); and, John M.
Mbaku, Providing a Foundation for Wealth Creation and Development in Africa: The
Role and Rule of Law, 38 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 959 (2013), for a chronicle of the positive
influence of the rule of law on economic development.
244. See, e.g., LARRY DIAMOND, Nigeria: Pluralism, Statism, and the Struggle
for Democracy, in 2 DEMOCRACY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: AFRICA 45–49 (Larry
Diamond et al. eds.,1988) (chronicling “[t]he transition to the Second Republic”);
Jayson S. Myers, A Commitment to Reform: The Constitution and Politics of
Nigeria’s Second Civilian Regime (July 1982) (unpublished M.A. Thesis, University
of British Columbia) (focusing on the Second Republic from 1979 to 1983); Ignatius
Akaayar Ayua & Dakas C.J. Dakas, Federal Republic of Nigeria, in CONSTITUTIONAL
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power among elites in the land,245 joined by pervasive scam artistry
among the citizenry,246 the country still has a long way to go to
implement the attitudinal changes necessary to internalize political
engineering.247
Little evidence from the case study suggests that individually
(domestically) or jointly (i.e. in relations with each other) Senegal and
Gambia have accumulated the right quantum of cultural engineering
that, with other requisite elements, translates into an optimum structure
for economic development. The two states were unable to fashion a
mutually satisfactory common ground sufficient to satisfy concerns of
national security and save their political experiment.248 The same
inability to reach common grounds was also evident in economic
integration. The requisite commitment should include a search for
common ground that promotes interregional trade as opposed to
repeated pursuit of advantages inconsistent with the good of the whole.
Instead, like other member-states of ECOWAS, both countries
exhibited lax commitment to economic integration, evident in missed
targets, as well as a lack of sound and credible policies domestically to
drive economic integration that bedevil ECOWAS and other regional
economic communities in Africa.249 No issue portrays this lax
ORIGINS, STRUCTURE, AND CHANGE IN FEDERAL COUNTRIES 239 (John Kincaid &
George Alan Tarr eds., 2005) (covering all four Republics of the country).
245. See DANIEL JORDAN SMITH, A CULTURE OF CORRUPTION: EVERYDAY
DECEPTION AND POPULAR DISCONTENT IN NIGERIA (2008) (chronicling the
widespread nature of corruption in the daily lives of many Nigerians, many of which
are perpetrated by government officials, including police and other security
personnel).
246. See Erika Eichelberger, What I Learned Hanging Out with Nigerian Email
Scammers,
MOTHER
JONES
(Mar.
20,
2014,
5:00
AM),
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/03/what-i-learned-from-nigerianscammers.
247. See ROTIMI T. SUBERU, Institutions, Political Culture, and
Constitutionalism in Nigeria, in POLITICAL CULTURE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM: A
COMPARATIVE APPROACH 197 (Daniel P. Franklin & Michael J. Baun eds., 1995).
248. See supra notes 169–73 and accompanying text.
249. See Aka, supra note 196, at 194–96. Evolution of regional integration in
Africa usually means progress from a free trade area to a customs union (an advanced
form of free trade area that can include consummation of a common external tariff on
countries outside the zone) and beyond to eventual political union. Hartzenberg, supra
note 10, at 2 n.1. No African regional community has accomplished this full evolution
due to missed targets.
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commitment like the fact that, as members of a key customs union
within their sub-region with the mission of a common regional
currency,250 Senegal and Gambia remained steadfastly glued to
currencies tied to the monetary regimes of their former colonial
overlords.251
D. Political Performance is Necessary to Crown the Twin Factors of
Political Engineering and Cultural Engineering
The fourth teachable lesson from the case study on the failure of
the Senegambia Confederation relates to political performance. In the
sense that it is used here, the term refers to how well politicians, whether
elected or appointed, serve their countries.252 In the search for an
appropriate structure to conduct development, good leadership
embedded in political performance provides a critical glue that activates
political engineering and cultural engineering, without which they
remain inanimate.253
Scholars have devised various clusters of governmental activities
to measure political performance.254 One such cluster involves the
formulation and implementation of socioeconomic policies designed to
achieve economic development necessary to improve the living
standards of residents.255 Another, political stability, presents itself
when the government forges the kind of unity that creates an orderly
and predictable political environment that protects residents against the
threat of serious domestic turmoil.256 Third and final is the guarantee of

250. See, e.g., Common West African Currency: Eco in 2015, MODERN GHANA
(May 29, 2009), https://www.modernghana.com/news/219137/1/common-westafrica-currency-eco-in-2015.html.
251. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
252. ROLF H.W. THEEN & FRANK L. WILSON, COMPARATIVE POLITICS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO SEVEN COUNTRIES 20 (3d ed. 1996).
253. A political structure, no matter how creatively designed, is only as good as
the men and women who run it. Leaders are distinguished from mere power holders.
Instead, they are office holders capable of producing social change that will satisfy
the authentic yearnings of their followers. See JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS,
LEADERSHIP 4–5 (1978).
254. See THEEN & WILSON, supra note 252, at 20–21.
255. Id. at 20.
256. Id. at 21.
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human rights:257 basic guarantees of a political, economic, social and
cultural nature, which human beings everywhere need to lead a
complete and fulfilled life.258
Although human rights may not appear critical to the survival of a
nation, they are extremely important.259 As Professors Theen and
Wilson point out, “[a]ll member states of the United Nations have
accepted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which obligates
them to” guarantee for their citizens a range of basic human rights.260
These rights include “freedom from racial, religious, or sex
discrimination; the right to a fair trial; freedom of thought, conscience,
and religion; freedom of peaceful assembly and association; freedom to
hold opinions, to seek, receive, and impart ideas and information; the
right to elect leaders through universal suffrage; the right to work with
free choice of employment; [and] the right to education[,]” among
others.261 In short, the obligation to promote human rights evaluates the
ability of national leaders to “meet[] these pledges, keeping in mind the
differing levels of political development and the different concepts of
freedom.”262
Two of various possible composite indicators that could be said to
sum up all measures of political performance, would be per capita
income, and the percentage of the population who live below poverty
line. The first indicates the ability of a government to generate the

257. Id.
258. See Kenneth Roth, Human Rights Organization: A New Force for Social
Change, in REALIZING HUMAN RIGHTS: MOVING FROM INSPIRATION TO IMPACT 225,
230–31 (Samantha Power & Graham Allison, eds., 2000) (commenting on the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations General
Assembly in 1948).
259. See THEEN & WILSON, supra note 252, at 21. Professors Theen and Wilson
noted that, compared to the other two indices for measuring political performance,
evaluating human rights “is more controversial.” Id. Partly for this reason, they came
to the middle ground that “[a]s evaluations of the state of human rights are made, we
need to be aware that [developing] countries that are experiencing social change, or
that are seeking a way to integrate hostile social or ethnic groups, may well choose to
delay the implementation of full liberties until the crises of modernization or
integration are past.” Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
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wealth individual citizens need to satisfy their economic well-being.263
The second, defined universally in terms of the number of individuals
who live on less than $1.25 USD a day for low-income countries,
speaks to the ability of a government to alleviate extreme poverty.264
Like many African governments, Senegal and Gambia could do better
on political performance, within the limits of their lean material
resources, to the material glory of their longsuffering citizens. In
Senegal, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita averaged
approximately $940 USD from 1960 until 2015.265 Senegal’s per capita
income “reach[ed] an all-time high of $1091 USD in 1961 and a record
low of $793 USD in 1994.”266 In Gambia, GDP per capita income
averaged $511 USD from 1966 until 2015.267 Per capita income
“reach[ed] an all-time high of $562 USD in 2010 and a record low of
little over $414 USD in 1967.”268 As of 2015, after over half-century of
independence, both countries ranked within the classification of lowincome states (GDP of $1,025 or less USD per capita) as specified by
the World Bank.269 Nearly 50 percent of the population in both
countries still live below the poverty line.270 The only flicker of good
news that tempers the otherwise difficult economic story is that, based

263. See, e.g., J. TYLER DICKOVICK & JONATHAN EASTWOOD, COMPARATIVE
POLITICS: INTEGRATING THEORIES, METHODS, AND CASES 82 (2013).
264. See, e.g., Press Release, New Data Show 1.4 Billion Live on Less Than US
$1.25 a Day, But Progress Against Poverty Remains Strong, WORLD BANK (Aug. 16,
2008), http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2008/09/16/new-data-show14-billion-live-less-us125-day-progress-against-poverty-remains-strong.
265. Senegal GDP Per Capita 1960-2016, TRADING ECONS.,
www.tradingeconomics.com/senegal/gdp-per-capita.
266. Id.
267. Gambia GDP Per Capita 1966-2016, TRADING ECONS.,
www.tradingeconomics.com/gambia/gdp-per-capita.
268. Id.
269. World Bank Country and Lending Group: Country Classification, DATA
HELP DESK, https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519world-bank-country-and-lending-groups (last visited Mar. 14, 2017).
270. See Senegal, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 37; Gambia, THE WORLD
FACTBOOK, supra note 69. See also Matthew Evans Teti, Gambia, in ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF WORLD POVERTY 414 (Mehmet Odekon, ed., 2006) (disclosing that in 2005, over
sixty percent of Gambians lived below the poverty line, with poverty concentrated
largely in rural regions and the eastern half of the country, especially among women).
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on recent International Monetary Fund’s global economic outlook data,
Senegal ranks among the ten fastest-growing economies in Africa.271
V. CONCLUSION
Africa’s artificial boundaries inherited from European imperialism
will have to be redrawn to make room for viable nation-states that will
form the vehicle for economic development in the 21st century. For the
best result, the task must be performed by an international organization,
such as the African Union:272 the same route through which the artificial
boundaries were constructed in the first place. The difference is that this
time, Africans will redraw the boundaries themselves. Such a large
undertaking requires consensus, which is unlikely to be found anytime
soon. Even if consensus was attained, boundaries must be redrawn with
the consideration that everything is constantly in flux. Until the time
such consensus occurs, we must realistically settle with less grand
measures.
Such midrange strategies, elicited from a case study of the
Senegambia Confederation tracking the locust years of African
economic development during the lost years of the 1980s, comprise the
solutions of political engineering, cultural engineering, and political
performance. It is hard to minimize the impediment that Africa’s
artificial boundaries pose to good governance and development.
However, midrange strategies set the groundwork for grand solutions
like redrawing artificial boundaries.273
Not only does the Senegambia Confederation elicit midrange
strategies germane for the conduct of African political and economic
development, it also stands out as the boldest application yet of these
strategies since the unsuccessful union attempt of 1959 involving
Ghana, Guinea, and Mali.274 This Article presents an answer as to why
271. See Joe Myers, Which Are Africa’s Fastest-Growing Economies?, WORLD
ECON. FORUM (Apr. 19, 2016), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/04/whichare-africa-s-fastest-growing-economies/.
272. See Aka, supra note 196, at 201–05.
273. See Jackson & Rosberg, supra note 17, at 5 (noting that “public attitudes
and behavior” reflected in “the social and political boundaries between” ethnic groups
in Africa whose homelands straddle two or more countries may be “more significant”
than the physical boundaries dividing the countries).
274. See supra notes 178–79.
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the political experiment failed. The explanation focused on three
teachable lessons from that failure: the appropriate structure necessary
for robust development in Africa, broadly defined, requires (1) political
engineering and (2) cultural engineering with (3) political performance.
The right mix of these goods will depend on the particular country or,
as with the Senegambia Confederation that formed the case study here,
the set of countries involved. The relative stability in Senegambia,
particularly with respect to Senegal, one of the few countries in Africa
yet to experience a military takeover of power, obscures broader issues
bearing on appropriate structure for development that the failure of the
ill-fated union between Senegal and Gambia brought to the fore.
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